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A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE: THE EROSION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS  
 
“A generation ago, we did it right.  We passed civil rights law to prohibit 
discrimination.  But special interests hijacked the civil rights movement.  Instead of 
equality, governments imposed quotas, preferences, and set-asides. . . . 
That’s just plain wrong and unjust.  Government should not discriminate.  It must 
not give a job, a university admission, or a contract based on race or sex.  Government 
must judge all people equally, without discrimination!”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Perhaps no subject generates as much controversy today as that of affirmative 
action.2  Affirmative action has been described as “a phrase that conjures up images of 
everything from set-asides for government contractors to diversity programs for 
college students.”3  Connotations of “quotas” and “preferences” that are inherent in the 
                                                 
1  SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION 30 (1996) 
(ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET], 
reprinted in Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1335, app. 1397-98 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 209) (1997). 
2  To appreciate the current controversial nature of affirmative action, see Jean Stefancic, 
Affirmative Action: Diversity of Opinions--An Overview of the Colorado Law Review 
Symposium, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 833 (1997):   
Three decades after enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, affirmative action has 
become once again a lightning rod--the focus of attention by legislators, university 
governing boards, newspaper editors, and courts.  Debate about affirmative action 
addresses questions of legality, fairness, and the various rationales put forth to 
justify or condemn it.  As controversial as the issue itself are the questions of who 
should be able to put affirmative action programs and policies into effect, and on 
what kind of showing. 
 Id. 
3  Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1745 
(1996).  The authors suggest that government set-asides and diversity programs for college 
students are two very different affirmative action scenarios which should be analyzed 
separately, including applicable case law.  Id.  While government set-asides guarantee 
minority firms a chance to participate in government business, college diversity programs 
bring “young adults from diverse backgrounds together into a democratic dialogue . . . .”  Id.  
Another definition of affirmative action includes “a policy or program for correcting the 
effects of discrimination in the employment or education of members of certain groups, as 
women, blacks, etc.” WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 33 (2nd ed. 1983); 
 cf. Nicolaus Mills, Introduction, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1, 2-3 (Nicolaus Mills, 
ed., 1994) (commenting on Harvard law professor Randall Kennedy’s description of 
affirmative action as ‘policies that provide preferences based explicitly on membership in a 
designated group’).  
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administration of affirmative action programs have led to increasingly negative 
sentiment from many sectors of society.4  Indeed, the very future of affirmative action 
may be threatened.5 
 
Twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark university 
admissions affirmative action case of Regents of University of California v. Bakke.6  In 
Bakke, the Court struck down a two-track race-based admissions program at the 
Medical School of the University of California at Davis.7  In a sharply divided opinion,8 
                                                                                                                         
Affirmative action is certainly that, but in practice it raises a series of additional 
issues, whether it is “soft” affirmative action that limits itself to special recruitment 
efforts or the kind of “hard” affirmative action that sets hiring goals. . . .  In the 1990s 
it is not simply the damage--psychological, social, economic--done by past 
discrimination that affirmative action seeks to remedy.  It also seeks to remedy 
practices that even if they do not intentionally discriminate have a disparate or 
adverse impact--that is, result in minorities or women being underrepresented. 
Id. at 3. 
4  Lincoln Caplan et al., The Hopwood Effect Kicks in on Campus, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT , Dec. 23, 1996, at 28.  In a poll by the magazine on problems concerning Americans, 
affirmative action ranked “surprisingly low”; it tied for 30th place on a list of major issues, 
after tax code reform and abolition of the IRS.  Id.  “But references to ‘quotas’ or ‘preferences’ 
tap into economic worry and racial resentment and tip opinion to the negative.”  Id.; cf.  Larry 
Reibstein, What Color is an A?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 1997, at 76.  “Polls show that Americans 
are as ambivalent as ever about affirmative action.  Most people tend to favor the idea of 
racial diversity in the workplace and on campus yet don’t especially like giving preferences to 
minorities.  Instead, Americans favor special programs for poor people, of whatever race.”  Id. 
5  See Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 881, 881 (1996).  Chin writes: 
Affirmative action is in full retreat:  the Supreme Court is increasingly hostile to it; 
Republican presidential candidates denounce it; and even the Regents of the 
University of California, the inventors of the plan attacked in Board of Regents v. 
Bakke, recently voted to end race consciousness in hiring and admissions. 
Id. at 882 (footnotes omitted). 
6  438 U.S. 265 (1978).  Bakke was a white male who was rejected twice for admission to the 
Medical School of the University of California at Davis.  Id. at 276.  He challenged the medical 
school’s admissions program, which reserved sixteen of its one hundred places in the entry 
class for minorities, claiming Constitutional violations under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Id. at 278-79.  
7  Id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.).  The medical school maintained a regular admissions 
program and a special admissions program for minorities.  Id. at 265.  The special admissions 
program was operated by a separate committee.  Id.  Special admissions candidates did not 
have to meet the same academic criteria as the general admissions group nor were they ranked 
against candidates in the general admissions group.  Id.  Bakke contended that the special 
admissions program “was a rigid quota that excluded him on the basis of his race.”  Amar & 
Katyal, supra  note 3, at 1747.   
8  Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood II), 78 F.3d 932, 941 (5th Cir. 1996), reh’g en banc denied, 
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Justice Powell wrote that while quotas based solely on race or ethnicity were 
unconstitutional,9  an admissions program may consider racial and ethnic diversity as a 
“plus” factor; racial and ethnic diversity “is only one element in a range of factors a 
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student 
body.”10  “[A]ttainment of a diverse student body. . . . clearly is a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”11  After Bakke, educational 
institutions struggled to design affirmative action programs that complied with the 
decision’s diversity rationale and often adopted preferential admissions policies.12  
 
The Bakke case marks the one and only time the Supreme Court has considered the 
constitutionality of affirmative action programs in university admissions.13  However, 
                                                                                                                         
84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (writing on Bakke that “[t]he 
Court reached no consensus on a justification for its result . . . .  Six Justices filed opinions, 
none of which garnered more than four votes . . . .”). 
9  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.).  Powell wrote that because the medical 
school’s special admissions program focused solely on race, it hindered rather than promoted 
genuine diversity.  Id.   
10  Id. at 314.  Other factors could include “exceptional personal talents, unique work or 
service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of 
overcoming disadvantage, [and] ability to communicate with the poor . . . .”  Id. at 317.  
11  Id. at 311-12. 
12  Chin, supra  note 5, at 881.  The author asserts that Bakke has a weak legal effect due to 
its failure to define diversity as either cultural diversity or racial diversity.  Id.  As a result, 
many law schools, for example, base their affirmative action programs on such non-diversity 
grounds as “remedying societal discrimination or increasing the numbers of minority 
professionals . . . .”  Id.; cf. Mills, Introduction, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra 
note 3, at 3 (“In higher education, where a commitment to diversity has sanctioned the 
downplaying of grades and test scores for minority students, affirmative action can mean the 
difference between acceptance or rejection by an elite university.”).  
13  Other plaintiffs challenging affirmative action admissions in higher education have 
petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari, but the Court has denied the petitions on 
mootness grounds.  See Defunis v. Odegaard,  416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974) (deeming an Equal 
Protection challenge to the admissions process at University of Washington School of Law 
moot because Defunis was due to graduate from law school).  See also  Hopwood v. Texas 
(Hopwood IV),  116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (declining to hear a constitutional challenge to the 
admissions process at the University of Texas Law School).  In an opinion by Justice 
Ginsburg and joined by Justice Souter, the Court acknowledged that the constitutional issue 
of using race or ethnicity in a public higher education admissions process “is an issue of 
great national importance.”  Id.  However, the Court noted that the objectionable admissions 
process had already been discontinued for some time, making the issue moot.  Id.  In addition, 
the petitioners were challenging the Court of Appeal’s rationale.  Id.   “ ‘[T]his Court,’ 
however, ‘reviews judgments, not opinions.’ ”  Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). 
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recent developments  in Texas,14 California,15 and Michigan16  signal an erosion of the 
Bakke doctrine17 and a trend towards anti-affirmative action.18  The Supreme Court 
may not be able to avoid the issue much longer. 
 
This comment examines the recent trend towards anti-affirmative action in the 
context of university admissions policies.19  First, the comment will trace some of the 
formative history of affirmative action, including the Bakke decision.20  It will then 
review and analyze specific judicial and legislative events which suggest a trend towards 
anti-affirmative action.21  Finally, the comment will explore the different rationales for 
affirmative action and suggest some alternatives to racial preferences in admissions 
                                                 
14  In Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood II), 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals struck down an admissions program at the University of Texas Law School 
which gave racial preferences to minority applicants through lower admissions criteria and a 
different admissions process.  The court held that the government had not shown any 
compelling interests to justify the racially discriminatory admissions program.  Id. at 955.  
Most significantly, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected Bakke’s diversity rationale by holding 
that the law school “may not use race . . . in deciding which applicants to admit in order to 
achieve a diverse student body . . . .”  Id. at 962. 
15  On November 5, 1996, Californians passed Proposition 209, a constitutional amendment 
which prohibits discrimination and racial and gender preferences in the areas of public 
employment, education, and contracting.  Darnell Weeden, Affirmative Action California 
Style--Proposition 209: The Right Message While Avoiding a Fatal Constitutional 
Attraction Because of Race and Sex, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 281, 282 (1997). 
16  A group of white students rejected by the University of Michigan challenged the 
school’s admissions policies which apparently incorporated racial preferences and lower 
academic standards for minorities.  Adam Cohen, The Next Great Battle Over Affirmative 
Action, TIME, Nov. 10, 1997, at 52.    
17  Amar & Katyal, supra  note 3, at 1745 (“Bakke, it seems, now hangs by a thread.”); see 
Chin, supra  note 5, at 881-82 (writing that “there is real doubt” whether Powell’s diversity 
rationale for affirmative action admissions “will survive much longer”). 
18  See Mills, Introduction, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION supra note 3, at 4.  The 
author writes: 
Unlike the debate over political correctness or multiculturalism, the debate over 
affirmative action is one in which a broad cross section of the population believes it 
has a personal stake in the outcome.  For middle-class and working-class whites, 
who see themselves facing downward mobility in the 1990s, the great fear is that 
affirmative action will hasten their slide into poverty by closing off opportunities 
they would have had a generation earlier.  For these whites, affirmative action, 
despite its emp hasis on inclusion rather than exclusion, often seems tantamount to 
reverse discrimination. 
Id. at 4-5. 
19  While this comment is primarily limited to racial preferences in university admissions 
programs, there is a necessarily overlap into other applications of affirmative action as well. 
20  Infra PART II. 
21  Infra PART III. 
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policies.22 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  History of Affirmative Action 
 
Notions of affirmative action originated in the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment23 of the United States Constitution.24 In Strauder v. West Virginia,25 the 
Supreme Court wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment was “one of a series of 
constitutional provisions26 having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race 
                                                 
22  Infra PART  IV. 
23  GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 684-85 (3rd ed. 1996) (“[T]he original 
impetus for passage of the amendment was a desire to expand the scope of congressional 
power to enact the nineteenth-century analogue of affirmative action measures.”). 
24   The text reads: 
Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
25  100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that a West Virginia statute limiting jurors to white males 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
26  The constitutional amendments securing civil rights to all races are the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.  Justice Harlan wrote about this series of 
amendments in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (establishing the “separate but equal” doctrine in racial segregation cases): 
The thirteenth amendment does not permit the withholding or the deprivation of 
any right necessarily inhering in freedom.  It not only struck down the institution of 
slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of 
any burdens or disabilities that constitute budges of slavery or servitude.  It 
decreed universal civil freedom in this country.  This court has so adjudged.  But, 
that amendment having been found inadequate to the protection of the rights of 
those who had been in slavery, it was followed by the fourteenth amendment, which 
added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship, and to the security 
or personal liberty . . . .  These two amendments, if enforced according to their true 
intent and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and 
citizenship.  Finally, and to the end that no citizen should be denied, on account of 
his race, the privilege of participating in the political control of his country, it was 
declared by the fifteenth amendment that “the right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on 
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.” 
Id. 
5
Anderson: The Erosion of Affirmative Action
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
recently emancipated, a race that through many generations had been held in slavery, all 
the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.”27  The pertinent section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment for affirmative action is the Equal Protection Clause.28  The Equal 
Protection Clause provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal 
protection of the laws."29  The underlying policy of the Equal Protection Clause is that 
state government must treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner.30 
                                                 
27  Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306. 
28  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to state action only.  Id.  Equal Protection claims based on federal action 
are derived from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution which provides, in 
pertinent part, that “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Despite the fact that the language of the Fifth 
Amendment “is not as explicit a guarantee of equal treatment as the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
the Supreme Court has held that there is no distinction between claims brought under either 
of the two Amendments.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1995). 
29  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  For the full text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see supra  note 24.  See Weeden, supra  note 15, at 285 (maintaining that “the 
Equal Protection Clause must be properly understood as a general requirement of equality for 
all persons without exception”).  The author acknowledges the paradox of demanding 
equality while allowing laws which classify.  “In tackling this paradox the Court has neither 
abandoned the demand for equality nor denied the legislative right to classify.  It has taken a 
middle course.  It has resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialization and 
constitutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification.”  Id.; see also  Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution which 
prohibited the state or any of its agencies from enacting legislation which gave homosexuals 
minority status, preferences, protected status, or claim to discrimination).  The Supreme Court 
wrote: 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s promise that no person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws must co-exist with the practical necessity that most legislation 
classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups 
or persons.  (citations omitted) We have attempted to reconcile the principle with 
the reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a 
suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a 
rational relation to some legitimate end. 
Id. at 631.  This compromise between equal protection of the laws and legislative 
classification reflects the rational basis test discussed infra note 30. 
30  This policy reflects the Yick Wo  principle which originated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356 (1885) (holding that a facially neutral statute requiring permits for laundry operators 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when all Chinese 
applicants were denied permits). 
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is 
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, 
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in 
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within 
the prohibition of the Constitution. 
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Id. at 373-74; see Weeden, supra  note 15, at 286 (“Similarly situated is defined not by the 
nature of the classification but the reasonable nexus of the classification scheme to the 
purpose of the law.”).  Thus, a critical element in Equal Protection analysis is a finding that a 
government actor intended to discriminate by treating a particular group differently.  See 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting a statistical study as insufficient proof of 
racial discrimination in a capital sentencing scheme). 
Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who alleges an 
equal protection violation has the burden of proving “the existence of purposeful 
discrimination.”  A corollary to this principle is that a criminal defendant must prove 
that the purposeful discrimination “had a discriminatory effect” on him.  Thus, to 
prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the 
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. 
Id. at 292 (citations omitted).   Intent to discriminate generally arises in one of three types of 
cases.  First, the state action is discriminatory on its face.  See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308 
(holding that a West Virginia statute limiting jurors to white males violated the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute 
all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their 
color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is 
practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, 
and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to 
individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others. 
Id.  In the second type of case, the state action is neutral on its face but discriminatory in its 
enforcement.  See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.  Third, the state action is facially neutral, and 
although a disproportionate impact is expected, “the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed 
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group.”  Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979) (upholding a Massachusetts law considering veterans for state civil service positions 
ahead of nonveterans because the purpose of the law was not to exclude women); see also 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a qualifying test measuring the verbal 
skills of job applicants for police officer positions in the District of Columbia Police 
Department).  The Supreme Court wrote: 
This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be 
express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a law’s disproportionate impact 
is irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination.  A 
statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of race. 
Id. at 241.  For a discussion of the “intent test” and the “effects test” in determining racially 
discriminatory intent, see Lino A. Graglia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From 
Prohibiting to Requiring Racial Discrimination in Employment, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 108-10 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994).  If there is an intent to discriminate on the part of 
the state actor, the next inquiry is whether the state action was directed at a suspect class or 
classification (or whether a fundamental right involved).  Id.  Definition of the suspect class or 
classification will determine the appropriate level of judicial review--strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis test--and  thus, can dramatically affect the outcome of 
7
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a case.  Id.; e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute authorizing 
local school districts to deny free public education to children of illegal aliens). 
In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek 
only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a 
legitimate public purpose [rational basis test]. 
But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if 
we applied so deferential a standard to every classification. The Equal Protection 
clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with 
elemental constitutional premises.  Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious 
those classifications that disadvantage a “suspect class,” or that impinge upon the 
exercise of a “fundamental right.”  With respect to such classifications, it is 
appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to 
demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to service a compelling 
governmental interest [strict scrutiny].  In addition, we have recognized that certain 
forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise 
to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we have 
sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent 
with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as 
furthering a substantial interest of the State [intermediate scrutiny]. 
Id. at 216-18 (footnoted omitted).  To determine whether a particular group is a suspect class 
or classification, courts generally look to six factors:  (1) history of discrimination, (2) 
immutable traits, (3) politically powerless, (4) subject to a legal disability, (5) stigmatization or 
archaic stereotypes, and (6) whether there is a trait unrelated to legitimate government 
objectives.  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that a federal law which 
automatically allowed a male uniformed services member to claim his spouse as a dependent 
but required a female uniformed services member to show that her spouse was dependent on 
her for over half his support violated the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment).  The Supreme Court wrote: 
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of 
sex discrimination. . . . 
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden 
with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed . . . the position 
of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under 
the pre-Civil War slave codes.  Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on 
juries, or bring suit in their own names. . . .  And although blacks were guaranteed 
the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right . . . until adoption of the 
Nineteenth Amendment half a century later. 
. . . .  
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon 
the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the basic 
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility. . . .”  And what differentiates sex from such non-suspect 
statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized 
suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to 
8
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The Fourteenth Amendment laid a constitutional framework in two different ways.31 
 First, it set the stage for the passage of additional legislation which would protect the 
rights of newly freed slaves.32  Second, the Fourteenth Amendment limited the power 
of the judiciary.33  Against this historical backdrop, African Americans were the 
intended beneficiaries of the earliest forms of affirmative action.34  
 
The modern era of affirmative action began in 196135 when President John F. 
Kennedy first coined the term “affirmative action”36 in Executive Order 10,925.37  The 
                                                                                                                         
perform or contribute to society. 
Id. at 684-87 (citation omitted).  Challenges to affirmative action plans in university 
admissions frequently involve racial classifications.  The Supreme Court has held that all 
governmental racial classifications must be examined under a strict scrutiny standard of 
review.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  Gender classifications 
are examined under an intermediate scrutiny standard of review.  “[C]lassifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (deeming 
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 
the age of 21 and females under the age of 18).  
31  STONE ET AL., supra note 23, at 685. 
32  Id. 
33  Id.  The authors write that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, in part, to allay 
Congress’ fears that the Supreme Court would invalidate the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  Id. 
34  See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom? , 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 
899-900 (1995). 
African Americans are the paradigmatic group for affirmative action, an 
extraordinary remedy which was designed to ameliorate the legacy of a history of 
slavery and pervasive discrimination against them based on their race--a legacy that 
persists today.  Other groups also have suffered from widespread prejudice and 
mistreatment . . . [and] other groups have populations that are seriously 
disadvantaged--some, perhaps, intractably so; and many other groups certainly are 
salient to contemporary American life.  But no other group compares to African 
Americans in the confluence of the characteristics that argue for inclusion in 
affirmative action programs. 
Id. 
35  Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 33 
(1992). 
36  Georgiana Verdugo, Edited Comment on Defining Affirmative Action by Reference to 
History, 95 ANN. SURV.  AM. L. 383, 383 (1995); see Mills, Introduction, in DEBATING 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra  note 3, at 5 (writing that President Kennedy only used the term 
“affirmative action” once in the executive order, and he used it in the context of the traditional 
goal of nondiscrimination).  Mills writes that President Kennedy issued the order because he 
did not believe he had the power at the time to effect civil rights legislation through Congress. 
 Id. at 5-6. 
37  Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961).  Executive Order 10, 925 was superseded by 
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order forbade federal government contractors from discriminating on the basis of “race, 
creed, color, or national origin,”38 and required contractors “to take affirmative action” 
to prevent discrimination to both applicants and employees.39  In 1964, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act.40  This legislation prohibited “race . . . [and ethnicity] 
discrimination by private employers, agencies, and educational institutions receiving 
federal funds.”41  The scope of affirmative action expanded considerably when 
President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246 in 1965 which provided 
for “equal opportunity in Federal employment for all qualified persons . . . [and] 
prohibit[ed] discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color, or national 
origin.”42  Creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by Congress43 
followed as a vehicle for reviewing federal affirmative action policies.44  “By the 1970's, 
federal agencies began enforcing regulations calling for timetables and goals to 
                                                                                                                         
Executive Order 11,246.  Infra note 42. 
38  Eastland, supra  note 35, at 33. 
39  Executive Order 10,925 reads in pertinent part: “The contractor will take affirmative 
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employees treated during employment, 
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”  3 C.F.R. 448. 
40  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 (West 1994). 
41  Stefancic, supra  note 3, at 833.  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
provides:  “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation “in,” be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 
See Tanya Y. Murphy, An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in Higher 
Education, 95 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 515, 515 (1995) (“With the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, the American people renewed their century-old commitment to removing the bonds of 
slavery that imprisoned United States citizens of African descent for nearly four centuries.”); 
cf. Mills, Introduction, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra  note 3, at 6 (writing that the 
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was deliberately cautious, because in order to 
overcome a Southern filibuster, the “Senate sponsors had to promise that the bill would not 
legalize preferences.”). 
42  Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e (West 1994).  Section 101 provides: 
It is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity 
in Federal employment for all qualified persons, to prohibit discrimination in 
employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin, and to promote the full 
realization of equal employment opportunity through a positive, continuing program 
in each executive department and agency.  The policy of equal opportunity applies 
to every aspect of Federal employment policy and practice. 
3 C.F.R. 339; see Mills, Introduction, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 7 
(writing that the Johnson administration and Executive Order 11,246 dramatically redefined the 
scope of affirmative action by acknowledging that “equalizing the rules of competition was 
insufficient” and that “[s]pecial help was also needed”).  
43  Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
44  Stefancic, supra note 3, at 833. 
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implement affirmative action.”45 
 
While the initial efforts of affirmative action seemed to be directed primarily at 
employment, affirmative action extended to other areas as well, including admissions 
programs in higher education.46  As the application of affirmative action expanded, so 
did the group of intended beneficiaries.47 
 
Thirty-seven years have passed since President Kennedy issued Executive Order 
10,925.  Today, the original goals of promoting equality and eliminating discrimination 
are clouded over by “an increasing number of Americans . . . declar[ing] war on 
policies giving ‘preferential’ treatment to specified racial and ethnic groups.”48 
 
B.  The Bakke Era 
 
Until the last few years, the 1978 Bakke decision reigned supreme in the area of 
affirmative action admissions programs in higher education.  In Bakke, Allan Bakke was 
rejected twice for admission to the Medical College of the University of California at 
                                                 
45  Id.  The author writes that opponents began to use the term “quotas”  to describe the 
federal agencies’ affirmative action plans.  Id.   
46  Id. 
In due course, lawmakers stitched affirmative action into a series of federal laws 
and regulations affecting all public employers and all but the smallest private 
employers.  Affirmative action, however, was not limited to the employment 
context.  Most notably, it extended to the admissions offices of colleges, 
universities, and professional and graduate schools. 
Id.  (footnote omitted). 
47  Eastland, supra  note 35, at 33 ( “Those whom affirmative action was intended to benefit 
came to include not only blacks, the original focus of Executive Order 10,925, but also, in most 
cases, Hispanics, Asian-Pacific Americans, and Native Americans.”).   
48  Murphy, supra note 41, at 516. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, created to reinforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of freedom and equality to the emancipated slave, 
has become the primary weapon in the effort to end affirmative action policies in 
employment and education.  Similarly, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
once provided an incentive to promote equal educational opportunities, is now used 
as a tool to force public and private universities to limit the reach of their affirmative 
action policies. 
Id. at 516-17 (footnotes omitted);  see Trisha Lacey, All in the Name of Diversity: Preferential 
Admissions in Higher Education, 6 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 111 (1997) (writing that 
“[c]urrent admission practices are in danger of being considered unconstitutional on two 
fronts”:  (1) They attempt to attain diversity by mirroring society minority representation with 
fixed admissions percentages, and (2) many admissions policies give rise to multi-tracked 
admissions programs to compensate for the disparity in minority academic credentials).  
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Davis.49  Bakke, a white male, challenged the two-track admissions program50 which he 
claimed violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by excluding him on the basis of his race.51 
 
In a fractured decision, the Supreme Court separated into two groups with sharply 
different opinions.  The Stevens Group52, comprised of Justice Stevens, Chief Justice 
Burger, and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concluded that the special admissions 
program violated Bakke’s rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.53  Thus, 
the Stevens Group never reached the constitutional issue; on a statutory basis alone, the 
Stevens group would have admitted Bakke to the medical school.54 
 
The Brennan Group, comprised of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, found the medical school’s special admissions program constitutional.55  In 
concluding that the program was constitutional, the Brennan Group applied an 
intermediate scrutiny standard of review.56  The Brennan Group found that the medical 
                                                 
49  Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276 (1978). 
50  Bakke applied to the medical school in 1973 and 1974.  Id.  At issue was the medical 
school’s two-track admissions program which had a general admissions program and a 
special admissions program.  Id. at 272.  The special admissions program was directed at 
minorities and was designed to “increase the representation of ‘disadvantaged’ students in 
each medical school class.”  Id. at 272-73.  Sixteen out of one hundred places in the entry 
class were reserved for minorities in the special admissions program.  Id. at 275.  Unlike 
candidates in the general admissions program, candidates in the special admissions program 
did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cut-off nor were they ever compared to 
candidates in the general admissions program.  Id.  In each of the two years that Bakke was 
rejected, applicants in the special admissions program were admitted with significantly lower 
grade point averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores than Bakke.  Id. at 277. 
51  Bakke also claimed violations of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
California Constitution and under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Id. at 278.  
52  The two contrary opinions in Bakke are often referred to as the Stevens Group and the 
Brennan Group. 
53  Id. at 412 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
54  Id. at 417-18.  The Stevens Group concluded that the language of Title VI alone was 
sufficient to sustain Bakke’s claim.   Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., Burger, C.J., Stewart, and 
Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  “[W]e need not decide the 
congruence--or lack of congruence--of the controlling statute and the Constitution since the 
meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of 
excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program.”  Id. at 417-18. 
55  Id. at 362.  The Brennan Group concluded that Title VI was violated only if the 
Constitution was violated; “Congress intended the meaning of the statute’s prohibition to 
evolve with the interpretation of the commands of the Constitution.”  Id. at 340.  Thus, their 
decision was based on constitutional grounds.  Id. 
56  The Brennan Group rejected a strict scrutiny standard of review which applies to 
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school’s purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimination was 
“sufficiently important” to support the use of its special admissions program “where 
there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and 
chronic . . . .”57 
 
Justice Powell cast the swing vote in Bakke.58  He joined the Stevens Group in 
concluding that the medical school’s special admissions program could not be upheld.59 
 Contrary to the Brennan Group,60 Justice Powell applied a strict scrutiny standard of 
review.61  After identifying the medical school’s four asserted interests for maintaining 
                                                                                                                         
government action that infringes on a fundamental right or contains suspect classifications.  
Id. at 357.  Under strict scrutiny, the government action “can be justified only if it furthers a 
compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is 
available [that is, it must be narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling government 
purpose].”  Id.  In this case, the Brennan Group found neither a fundamental right nor a 
suspect class.  Id.  On the subject of whites as a suspect class, Justice Brennan wrote:   
[W]hites as a class [do not] have any of the “traditional indicia of suspectness: the 
class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process.”  
Id.  (quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).  
Thus, the Brennan Group  applied intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 361.  “[T]o justify such a 
classification an important and articulated purpose for its use must be shown.”  Id.  
57  Id. at 362. 
58  See Scott L. Olson, Comment, The Case Against Affirmative Action in the Admissions 
Process, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 991, 993 (1997) (“Despite the lack of a single opinion in Bakke, 
Justice Powell’s opinion has generally been regarded as the Court’s primary viewpoint.”). 
59  Bakke, 438 U.S 265, 320 (opinion of Powell, J.).  Justice Powell, however, based his 
decision on constitutional grounds.  Id.  “The fatal flaw in petitioner’s preferential program is 
its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. 
60  See Victor V. Wright, Note,  Hopwood v. Texas: The Fifth Circuit Engages in Suspect 
Compelling Interest Analysis in Striking Down an Affirmative Action Admissions Program, 
34 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 890 (1997) (writing that while the Brennan Group did not explicitly adopt 
Justice Powell’s diversity rationale, they did join the part of Justice Powell’s opinion that 
concluded “a State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly 
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic 
origin.”) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320). 
61  For the elements of strict scrutiny analysis, see supra  note 56.  The issue of what level 
of review applies to racial classifications was unequivocally resolved in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (remanding for strict scrutiny analysis an 
action challenging financial incentives given to federal government contractors to hire 
subcontractors controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals”).  “[W]e 
hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 227.  
For a critique of strict scrutiny in affirmative action, see Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 
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the special admissions program,62 Justice Powell found that the goal of an “ethnically 
diverse student body” was a permissible justification.63  In furthering that goal, a 
university admissions program could properly consider race and ethnicity as a “plus” 
factor along with other pertinent factors aimed at creating a diverse student body.64 
 
III.  RECENT TREND TOWARDS ANTI-AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
                                                                                                                         
107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997).  The author writes that “the Court’s recent affirmative action 
decisions have consummated a remarkable but unremarked-upon transformation in the entire 
analytic structure of heightened scrutiny doctrine.”  Id. at 428.  The author asserts that there 
has been a shift from using strict scrutiny to “smoke out” invidious purposes to a 
cost/benefit analysis whereby a law violating the Equal Protection Clause is “justified by the 
specially important social gains that is will achieve.” Id.   
Throughout Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, inadvertent harm to 
minorities, without more, is rejected as a basis of constitutional invalidity or even of 
heightened scrutiny.  Equal protection jurisprudence, outside the arena of 
affirmative action, generally does not engage in cost-benefit analysis.  It does not 
purport to measure up and balance the social gains and losses a law will produce.  
The constitutional question is instead whether a law embodies an invidious or 
otherwise constitutionally impermis sible purpose.  And this must be the 
constitutional question with respect to affirmative action as well. 
Id. at 428-29.  
62  According to Justice Powell: 
The special admissions program purports to serve the purposes of: (i) ‘reducing the 
historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the 
medical profession;’ [ ] (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination; (iii) 
increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently 
underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically 
diverse student body.   
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06 (opinion of Powell, J.) (footnote ommited). 
63  Id. at 311-312.  Justice Powell also acknowledged academic freedom as a “special 
concern of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 312.  That freedom includes a university’s judgment 
in selecting its student body.  Id. 
64  Id. at 317.  Justice Powell wrote: 
This kind of program treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions 
process.  The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate 
receiving a “plus” on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed 
from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had 
the wrong surname.  It would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may 
have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other 
applicant.  His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and 
he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Id. at 318; see Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1750 (“This vision of university diversity, we 
submit, is the heart and soul of Bakke.”). 
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A.  Attack on Bakke in Hopwood v. Texas65 
 
After Bakke,  Justice Powell’s diversity rationale generally guided universities in 
formulating their affirmative action admissions programs.66  In 1996, however, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals flatly rejected Bakke’s diversity rationale in Hopwood v. 
Texas.67  The court held that “the use of race to achieve a diverse student body . . . 
simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough to meet the steep standard of strict 
scrutiny. . . .  [T]he key is that race itself shall not be taken into account.”68 
 
1.  The Facts 
 
Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliott, and David Rogers were white 
residents of Texas who applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School in 
1992.69  All four were rejected, and they brought suit against the law school claiming 
violations of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.70  The crux of their complaint was that the law school’s affirmative action 
admissions program71 subjected them to unconstitutional racial discrimination.72 
 
                                                 
65  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
66  See Wright, supra note 60, at 891 (writing that several law school deans testified at the 
district court level in Hopwood in support of a diverse student body, and that “moreover, a 
large majority of state colleges and universities operate admissions programs aimed at 
creating diversity in their student bodies”). 
67  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 948. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 938. 
70  Id.  The plaintiffs also claimed statutory violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Id. 
71  At the time of plaintiffs’ applications, the law school employed the following 
admissions program: The initial admissions decisions were based upon an applicant’s Texas 
Index (“TI”) number which was comprised of the applicant’s undergraduate grade point 
average and LSAT score.  Id. at 935.  Although subjective factors were considered as well, 
the TI scores placed applicants initially into one of three categories: “presumptive admit,” 
“presumptive deny,” or a middle range, referred to as “discretionary zone.”  Id.  Generally, the 
applications in the “discretionary zone” received the most attention from admissions 
personnel.  Id.  The school maintained separate and significantly lower TI ranges for African 
Americans and Mexican Americans ostensibly to meet targeted admissions goals of 5% 
African Americans and 10% Mexican Americans.  Id. at 936-37.  The law school also 
maintained a separate minority admissions committee to review these “discretionary zone” 
candidates.  Id. at 937.  In addition, each application was color-coded by race upon receipt, 
and the law school maintained segregated waiting lists.  Id. at 937-38.  The plaintiffs fell into 
the non-minority “discretionary zone.”  Id. at 938. 
72  Id.  The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Id. 
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2.  The District Court Decision 
 
 The district court analyzed the law school’s admissions program under a strict 
scrutiny standard of review.73  Of the five reasons the law school offered for 
maintaining its admissions program,74  the court held that two of the reasons qualified 
as compelling government interests: “obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a 
racially and ethnically diverse student body” and “overcoming the past effects of 
discrimination.”75  In considering the scope of past discrimination, the court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ argument that past discrimination be limited to the law school’s history 
only; instead, the court held that Texas’ “institutions of higher education are inextricably 
                                                 
73  Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood I), 861 F. Supp. 551, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d 
932 (5th Cir. 1996), reh’g en banc denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 
1033 (1996).  Since the law school clearly treated applicants differently based upon their race, 
the proper inquiry was whether the law school’s admissions program served both a 
compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.  Id. 
74  The five reasons offered by the law school as compelling interests follow: 
To achieve the School of Law’s mission of providing a first class legal education 
to future leaders of the bench and bar of the state by offering real opportunities for 
admission to members of the two largest minority groups in Texas, Mexican 
Americans and African Americans; 
To achieve the diversity of background and experience in its student population 
essential to prepare student for the real world functioning of the law in our diverse 
nation; 
To assist in redressing the decades of educational discrimination to which African 
Americans and Mexican Americans have been subjected in the public school 
systems of the State of Texas; 
To achieve compliance with the 1983 consent decree entered with the Office of Civil 
Rights of the Department of Education imposing specific requirement[s] for 
increased efforts to recruit African American and Mexican American students; 
To achieve compliance with the American Bar Association and the American 
Association of Law Schools standards of commitment to pluralist diversity in the 
law school’s student population.  
Id. at 570. 
75  Id. at 571.  The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that under recent Supreme 
Court decisions, the only compelling government interest for race-based programs was 
remedying the past effects of racial discrimination.  Id. at 570.  “However, none of the recent 
opinions is factually based in the education context and, therefore, none focuses on the 
unique role of education in our society.”  Id.  Thus, the court found that diversity would have 
been a sufficient compelling government interest to pass a strict scrutiny analysis by itself, 
but that remedying the past effects of discrimination was “an equally important goal.”  Id. at 
571.  The Fifth Circuit wrote that with the goals of remedying the effects of past discrimination 
and attaining student body diversity, “[t]he district court found both a compelling remedial 
and a non-remedial justification . . .”, respectively, for the law school’s use of race in its 
admissions program. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 941. 
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linked to the primary and secondary schools in the system.”76  As a result, Texas’ 
history of racial discrimination in public schools contributed to the law school’s 
reputation among minorities as both a “white school” and a hostile environment.77  
 
The court then analyzed whether the law school’s admissions program was 
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling government interests.78  The district court 
upheld that part of the admissions program which gave minorities a “plus” by treating 
their TI scores79 differently based upon race.80  However, the court struck down the 
part of the admissions program which used separate admissions committees and never 
compared candidates of different races.81  
 
3.  The Fifth Circuit Decision 
 
Like the district court, the Fifth Circuit applied a strict scrutiny standard of review to 
determine whether the law school’s use of race in its admissions program violated the 
                                                 
76  Hopwood I, 861 F. Supp. at 571.  The court noted that even if past discrimination was 
limited to the University of Texas alone, there would still be a strong basis for concluding that 
remedial action was warranted.  Id. at 572. 
77  Id.  There was no evidence of “overt officially sanctioned discrimination” at the 
University of Texas.  Id.  The school had expended considerable effort in recruiting minorities 
and minimizing racial discrimination. Id. However, the court found that the school’s “legacy of 
the past” still persisted into the present.  Id. The district court wrote that  “during the 1950s, 
and into the 1960s, the University of Texas continued to implement discriminatory policies 
against both black and Mexican American students.”  Id. at 555.  Between 1978 and 1980, the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) investigated 
Texas’ public higher education system and found that it was not in compliance with Title VI 
and still maintained vestiges of de jure segregation.  Id. at 556.  It was not until 1983 that 
Texas submitted an acceptable plan to OCR to remedy its deficiencies.  Id. “To date, OCR has 
not completed its evaluation to determine if Texas is in compliance with Title VI.”  Id. at 557. 
78  Id. at 572. 
79  The initial admissions decisions were based upon an applicant’s Texas Index (“TI”) 
number which was comprised of the applicant’s undergraduate grade point average and 
LSAT score.  Id. at 557. 
80  Id. at 578.  For a description of the law school’s admissions program, see supra note 71. 
81  Id. at 578-79.  The court wrote: 
Under the 1992 procedure, the possibility existed that the law school could select a 
minority, who, even with a “plus” factor, was not as qualified to be a part of the 
entering class as a nonminority denied admission.  Thus, the admission of the 
nonminority candidate would be solely on the basis of race or ethnicity and not 
based on individual comparison and evaluation.  This is the aspect of the procedure 
that is flawed and must be eliminated. 
Id.  The fatal flaw existed primarily with the separate admissions committees which were used  
for “discretionary zone” candidates.  For a description of the law school’s admissions 
program, see supra  note 71.  
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Equal Protection Clause.82  However, the three-judge panel reached a much different 
conclusion when it examined the two compelling government interests relied on by the 
district court.  The court found that neither attaining a diverse student body nor 
remedying the effects of past discrimination were compelling government interests 
sufficient to justify the law school’s race-based admissions program.83  As a result, the 
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision and remanded it for further 
proceedings.84 
 
The Fifth Circuit held that use of race or ethnicity to achieve a diverse student body 
is not a compelling interest under Fourteenth Amendment analysis.85  Judge Smith 
supported his holding on three different bases.86  First,87 Judge Smith wrote that Justice 
Powell’s diversity rationale in Bakke “is not binding precedent on this issue.”88  
Second,89 “[n]o case since Bakke has accepted diversity as a compelling state interest 
under a strict scrutiny analysis; subsequent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the 
only compelling state interest to justify racial classifications is remedying the effects of 
past discrimination.”90  Third, Judge Smith opposed the use of race as a means of 
                                                 
82  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 940. 
83  Id. at 962. 
In summary, we hold that the University of Texas School of Law may not use race as 
a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student 
body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to 
alleviate the law school’s poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate 
any present effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school. 
Id.   
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 944. 
86  David Schimmel, Is Bakke Still Good Law?  The Fifth Circuit Says No and Outlaws 
Affirmative Action Admissions, 113 ED. LAW. REP. 1052, 1055-56 (1996) (writing that Judge 
Smith justified his denial of race as a factor in achieving student body diversity on three 
grounds).  First, Justice Powell’s diversity rationale in Bakke never received the support of 
any other justices.  Id. at 1055.  Second, subsequent Supreme Court precedent supported the 
proposition that the only compelling interest to justify racial classifications is remedying past 
discrimination.  Id.  Third, “there are strong policy arguments against the use of race to 
promote diversity.”  Id. at 1056 (quoting Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 945).  
87  See id. at 1055. 
88  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 944.  Judge Smith wrote that the word “diversity” was 
mentioned only in Justice Powell’s single-Justice opinion, and that when he “announced the 
judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the diversity 
rationale.”  Id. 
89  See Schimmel, supra  note 86, at 1055. 
90  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 944.  Judge Smith wrote: “In short, there has been no indication 
from the Supreme Court, other than Justice Powell’s lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state’s 
interest in diversity constitutes a compelling justification for governmental race-based 
discrimination.  Subsequent Supreme Court caselaw strongly suggests, in fact, that it is not.”  
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss1/4
1999] THE EROSION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
achieving student body diversity on policy grounds.91  He wrote that the use of race in 
higher education admissions “contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal 
protection.”92  It “simply achieves a student body that looks different.  Such a criterion 
is no more rational on its own terms than would be choices based upon the physical 
size or blood type of applicants.”93 
 
The Fifth Circuit next turned to an evaluation of the compelling government interest 
of remedying the effects of past discrimination.94  The court began by noting that a 
state actor “must ensure . . . it has convincing evidence that remedial action is 
warranted.”95  In addition, the “use of racial remedies must be carefully limited” and a 
“state’s use of remedial racial classification is limited to the harm caused by a specific 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at 945.  Judge Smith relied on Supreme Court decisions outside the higher education 
context to conclude that “the Court appears to have decided that there is essentially only one 
compelling state interest to justify racial classifications:  remedying past wrongs.”  Id. at 944.  
“As the plurality in Croson warned, ‘[c]lassifications based on race carry the danger of 
stigmatic harm.  Unless they are reserved for remedial setting, they may in fact promote 
notions of racial inferiority and lead to the politics of racial hostility.’ ”  Id. at  947 (quoting 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)); see infra, text accompanying note 
97. 
91  See Schimmel, supra  note 86, at 1056. 
92  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 945. 
93  Id.  Judge Smith wrote further:  “Diversity fosters, rather than minimizes, the use of race. 
 It treats minorities as a group, rather than as individuals .  It may further remedial purposes 
but, just as likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility.”  Id.  
Judge Smith stressed that a school could reasonably consider many other factors outside of 
race in making its admissions decisions, including those “which may have some correlation 
with race.” Id. at 946.   
A university may properly favor one applicant over another because of his 
ability to play the cello, make a downfield tackle, or understand chaos theory.  An 
admissions process may also consider an applicant’s home state or relationship to 
school alumni.  Law schools specifically may look at things such as unusual or 
substantial extracurricular activities in college, which may be atypical factors 
affecting undergraduate grades.  Schools may even consider factors such as 
whether an applicant’s parents attended college or the applicant’s economic and 
social background. 
Id.  The court observed that diversity “can take many forms;” however, applicants must be 
evaluated individually, “rather than resorting to the dangerous proxy of race.”  Id. at 947.  
94  Id. at 948.  The school identified three effects of past discrimination: A hostile 
environment for minorities at the law school, the school’s poor reputation among minorities, 
and underrepresentation of minorities in the student body.  Id. at 952.  The plaintiffs argued 
that these were examples of generalized societal discrimination which the Supreme Court has 
held to be an invalid remedial basis.  Id.; see also infra notes 97, 98 and accompanying text. 
95  Id. at 950 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)); 
infra note 98. 
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state actor.”96  After reviewing the Supreme Court decisions of City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson97 and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,98 the court concluded that 
the law school, not the State of Texas’ educational system, was the “appropriate 
governmental unit for measuring a constitutional remedy.”99  The court then considered 
the three present effects of past discrimination put forth by the law school to justify its 
remedial admissions program: A hostile environment for minorities, the school’s poor 
reputation among minorities, and underrepresentation of minorities; the court rejected 
each one.100  The Fifth Circuit held that the law school had not shown a compelling 
                                                 
96  Id.   
97  488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down the City of Richmond’s minority business set-aside 
program which was justified on remedial grounds).  The Court held that a “generalized 
assertion that there had been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance 
for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.”  Id. at 
498.  In this case, there was no proof of past discrimination in the Richmond construction 
industry, and the city’s program was not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal of remedying 
past discrimination.  Id. at 505, 508.  The Fifth Circuit placed particular emphasis on the 
Croson Court’s analogy of the employer contractor situation to that of higher education 
which noted that “[l]ike claims that discrimination in primary and secondary schooling 
justifies a rigid racial preference in medical school admissions, an amorphous claim that there 
has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding 
racial quota.”  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 950 (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 
469, 499 (1989)).   
98  476 U.S. 267 (1986) (rejecting a minority “role model” justification for a collective 
bargaining agreement between a school board and a teachers’ union that gave minorities 
preferential treatment in layoffs).  The Court found that (1) no remedial purpose was served 
by the preferential treatment because there was no logical cut-off period under the “role 
model” theory, (2) there was no evidence of prior discrimination requiring remedial action, and 
(3) generalized, past “societal” discrimination was never considered a sufficient compelling 
government purpose.  Olson, supra  note 58, at 993-94.   
99  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 950.  The court noted that the law school functioned as a 
separate unit within the University of Texas system with control over its own admissions 
program and personnel hiring.  Id.  The University of Texas System was “too expansive an 
entity to scrutinize for past discrimination.” Id. 
100  In rejecting the law school’s present effects arguments of a hostile environment and a 
poor reputation among minorities, the court relied on Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th 
Cir. 1994), reh’g en banc denied, 46 F.3d 5 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995) 
(striking down the use of a race-based scholarship program for African Americans at the 
University of Maryland).  The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the poor reputation 
was due to “historical fact” which was not the kind of present effect that could justify current 
racial classifications.  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 952-53.  In addition, the court wrote that “one 
cannot conclude that the law school’s past discrimination has created any current hostile 
environment for minorities.”  Id. at 953.  Rather, any racial tensions were the result of present 
societal discrimination.  Id.  Finally, the court rejected the underrepresentation of minorities as 
a present effect of past discrimination.  Id.  The fact that Texas had a history of racial 
discrimination in education was insufficient; the relevant state actor was the University of 
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state interest in remedial discrimination sufficient to justify its use of a race-based 
admissions program.101 
 
Judge Wiener wrote a concurring opinion.102  Although he agreed with the result, he 
disagreed that “diversity can never be a compelling governmental interest in a public 
graduate school.”103  Judge Wiener would have found the admissions program 
unconstitutional on grounds that it was not narrowly tailored.104  “I follow the solitary 
path of narrow tailoring rather than the primrose path of compelling interest to reach 
our common holding.”105  Judge Wiener was also uncomfortable with the majority’s 
outright rejection of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.  He wrote: “[I]f Bakke is to be 
declared dead, the Supreme Court, not a three-judge panel of a circuit court, should 
make that pronouncement.”106  
 
Subsequently, a suggestion for rehearing en banc initiated by a member of the court 
was denied when a majority of the Fifth Circuit’s sixteen regular active judges declined 
to rehear the issue.107  Seven judges dissented from the denial with sharp criticism.108  
The dissent wrote that the “far-reaching importance” of the Hopwood decision 
“demand[ed] the attention of more than a divided panel.”109  The dissent also criticized 
                                                                                                                         
Texas, and there was no showing of “overt officially sanctioned discrimination.” Id. at 954 
(quoting Hopwood I, 861 F. Supp. at 572).      
101  Hopwood II, 78 F. 3d at 955.  Because there was no showing of a compelling state 
interest, the Fifth Circuit did not have to consider whether the admissions program was 
narrowly tailored to achieve the state interest. 
102  Id. at 962 (Wiener, J., specially concurring). 
103  Id. 
104  Id.  On addressing whether diversity is a compelling government interest, Judge 
Wiener wrote: 
Rather than attempt to decide that issue, I would take a considerably narrower path--
and, I believe, a more appropriate one--to reach an equally narrow result:  I would 
assume arguendo that diversity can be a compelling interest but conclude that the 
admissions process here under scrutiny was not narrowly tailored to achieve 
diversity. 
Id.  Judge Wiener would have concluded that the admissions program was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve diversity because it limited minorities to African Americans and Mexican 
Americans only.  Id. at 965.       
105  Id. at 966. 
106  Id. at 963. 
107  Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood III), 84 F.3d 720,720 (1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 
(1996). 
108  Id. at 722 (Politz, J., dissenting from failure to grant rehearing en banc) (“We 
respectfully but emphatically dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.”).  
109  Id.  The dissent wrote further: 
When the occasional case of such far-reaching importance to this court, to public 
higher education, and to this nation comes down the pike, we have a duty to 
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the panel’s overruling of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke as a form of “judicial 
activism.”110  In the opinion of the dissenting judges, even if the panel members were 
totally convinced that the Supreme Court would overrule Bakke, “in the absence of an 
express overruling, they had no option but to grin, follow Bakke,  bear it, and patiently 
await the Supreme Court’s reconsideration.”111 
 
A petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied as moot.112  
Although Justices Ginsburg and Souter acknowledged that the constitutional issue of 
race- or ethnicity-based admissions programs in higher education “is an issue of great 
national importance,” the law school’s objectionable admissions program had already 
been discontinued for some time, making the issue moot.113 
 
4.  Analysis 
 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision demonstrated a lack of judicial restraint.114  While racial 
                                                                                                                         
address it and to do the best possible job that our whole court is capable of, 
regardless of the tactical decisions of the litigants.  To decline to rehear a case of 
this magnitude because the parties have not suggested that we do bespeaks an 
abdication of duty--the ducking of a tough questions by judges who we know first-
hand are made of sterner stuff. 
Id. 
110  Id. 
By tenuously stringing together pieces and shards of recent Supreme Court 
opinions that have dealt with race in such diverse settings as minority set asides for 
government contractors, broadcast licenses, redistricting, and the like, the panel 
creates a gossamer chain which it proffers as a justification for overruling Bakke. 
We are persuaded that this alone makes the instant case not just en banc-worthy 
but en banc mandatory. 
Id.  
111  Id. at 724. 
112  Hopwood IV, 116 S. Ct. 2581, 2581 (1996). 
113  Id.  Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the petitioners were challenging the Fifth Circuit’s 
rationale.  “ ‘[T]his court,’ however, ‘reviews judgments, not opinions.’ ” Id.  (quoting 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defenses Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).  
But cf. Schimmel, supra  note 86, at 1062 (writing that another interpretation of Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion is that the Supreme Court was not ready to rule on such a controversial 
issue).  The Court may have wanted other courts to wrestle with similar issues first and also 
give universities an opportunity to reexamine their admissions policies and related affirmative 
action programs.  Id. 
114  See Robert A. Lauer, Hopwood v. Texas: A Victory for “Equality” That Denies 
Reality, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 109, 133-34 (1996). 
While many laud Judge Smith’s aggressive judicial activism as a positive move 
toward establishing a true meritocracy in law school admissions, others cringe at the 
thought of possible resegregation and what amounts to mass confusion not only in 
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preferences should ultimately be eliminated, the Hopwood decision on diversity was 
premature.115  The court’s blatant disregard for Justice Powell’s diversity rationale in 
Bakke has elicited perhaps the most criticism.116  Even if Bakke’s divided opinion 
weakened the weight of its legal authority,117 “[f]ew would dispute that, before the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood, Justice Powell’s diversity rationale was widely 
accepted as the law of the land.”118  As Judge Wiener correctly noted in his concurring 
opinion, the Supreme Court is the appropriate judicial body to overrule Bakke.119 
 
In overruling Bakke and relying on Supreme Court cases outside the education 
arena,120 the Fifth Circuit ignored the special consideration the Supreme Court has 
traditionally accorded education.121  Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,122 
                                                                                                                         
those jurisdictions that must abide by his cryptic opinion but also throughout the 
rest of the country.  Thus, Hopwood is a perfect example of the quagmire that can 
result when policy, law, and reality clash. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
115  This author takes the position that racial preferences should ultimately be eliminated in 
higher education admissions, but only in conjunction with other measures designed to 
preserve the benefits of student body diversity.  Infra PART  IV. 
116  See Lauer, supra  note 114, at 132 (writing that Judge Smith ignored both judicial 
restraint and deference to Supreme Court precedent).  “In deciding Hopwood, the three-judge 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took it upon itself to 
effectively overrule Bakke’s holding that racial diversity is a compelling interest and thus 
alter the face of education in Texas and the United States.”  Id. at 132-33; Wright, supra note 
60, at 906 (“The fundamental flaw in the Hopwood panel majority’s opinion is its failure to 
exercise judicial restraint in analyzing the sensitive area of constitutional interpretation.”). 
117  See Laura C. Scanlan, Note, Hopwood v. Texas: A Backward Look at Affirmative 
Action in Education, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1580, 1587 (1996).  The author points out that while it 
is important to remember for precedential value that Justice Powell’s opinion was not fully 
joined by any other Justice, “[n]evertheless, no Justice argued that the use of race was 
wholly inappropriate in Davis Medical School’s admissions process.” Id; cf.  Robert J. 
Donahue, Note, Racial Diversity as a Compelling Government Interest, 30 IND. L. REV. 523, 
531 (1997).  The author contends that because the Bakke Court lacked consensus on a 
justification for its result, “[a]uthoritatively, it stands for very little as a whole” and “it did not 
set widely recognized precedent.”  Id. 
118  Wright, supra  note 60, at 891; supra  notes 58, 60 and accompanying text. 
119  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 964 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).  In Rodriguez de Quigas 
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989), the Supreme Court spoke 
directly to judicial restraint.  “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet 
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals 
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.” Id. (emphasis added).   
120  Supra  notes 97, 98, and accompanying text. 
121  See Schimmel, supra  note 86, at 1060 (writing that “[h]igher education is a unique 
context.  Therefore, even if more recent decisions have struck down racial preferences in 
minority business set asides or redistricting, such cases can be distinguished from higher 
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the Supreme Court has frequently recognized the uniqueness of the educational setting 
in Equal Protection cases.123  Specifically, the Court has acknowledged “those qualities 
which are incapable of objective measurement,” and the importance of providing an 
educational environment conducive to “the interplay of ideas and the exchange of 
views.”124  Thus, the Supreme Court has embraced diversity in higher education; based 
                                                                                                                         
education in view of its unique goals and methods.”).  The author also writes that universities 
enjoy the special protections of the First Amendment and academic freedom.  Id.; see also  
Scanlan, supra  note 117, at 1605 (distinguishing education from employment cases in that 
“[e]ducation, unlike employment, is a process in which the treatment a student receives at 
each level has a continuing impact . . .”).  Also, when “the Supreme Court has struck down 
affirmative action programs in contexts other than education, it has consistently emphasized 
that diversity has not been at issue.”  Id. at 1614;  Wright, supra note 60, at 894 (“Diversity in 
higher education is certainly different from diversity in the contracting and employment cases 
relied upon by the Hopwood court to ‘overrule’ Bakke.”).   
122  347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) by 
concluding “that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no 
place”).  The Court wrote: “[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments. . . .  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.”  Id. at 493.  
123  For example, in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Court ordered a black 
student to be admitted to the University of Texas Law School after finding that a parallel black 
school was not equal.  The Court wrote: 
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far 
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but 
which make for greatness in a law school.  Such qualities, to name a few, include 
reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of 
the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.  It is difficult to 
believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider 
the question close. 
Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware that 
it is an intensely practical one.  The law school, the proving ground for legal 
learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and 
institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has 
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the 
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned . . . . 
Id. at 634 (emphasis added).  In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), a 
black student admitted to the University of Oklahoma Department of Education was subjected 
to a designated desk in a separate room adjoining the classroom, a designated desk in the 
library, and an assigned table in the cafeteria where he ate at a different time than the other 
students.  The Court held that the physical restrictions, while technically equal, were 
unconstitutional because they  “impair[ed] and inhibit[ed] his ability to study, to engage 
in discussions and exchange views with other students, and in general, to learn his 
profession.” Id. at 641 (emphasis added).      
124  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).  See Murphy, supra note 41, at 539-40: 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the importance of education in 
American society. . . . 
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on Bakke,  diversity has been interpreted by the Court primarily as racial diversity.125 
 
The Fifth Circuit should have avoided the controversial “primrose path” of Bakkean 
diversity and chosen the “solitary path” of Judge Wiener’s “narrowly tailored” 
reasoning instead.126  Accepting that racial diversity is a compelling government interest 
in higher education admissions, the law school’s program simply was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve that purpose because it focused only on African Americans and 
Mexican Americans.127 
 
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the compelling government interest of remedying the 
effects of past discrimination also was problematic.  One commentator wrote: “It is 
ironic, given its racially troubled history, that an affirmative action program at the 
University of Texas School of Law would place such a stumbling block in the path of 
affirmative action at the nation’s institutions of higher learning.”128  Indeed, this is the 
very same law school that was ordered to admit an African American student in the 
1950's.129  
 
By denying the law school’s remedial interest because there was “no [recent] 
                                                                                                                         
In order to protect the unique role of education as a tool for shaping the views, 
values, and ideals of present and future generations, the Court has afforded wide 
deference to academic institutions and the state governments that control these 
institutions when reviewing cases affecting education. 
Id.   
125  See Scanlan, supra  note 117, at 1612.  The author writes that when the Supreme Court 
has spoken of diversity, it has emphasized diversity of experience.  Id.  According to this 
author, diversity of experience cannot be ensured without considering race.  Id. 
126  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 962 (Wiener, J., specially concurring); see supra note 104. 
127  Id.  Judge Wiener wrote: 
Focusing as it does on blacks and Mexican Americans only, the law school’s 1992 
admissions process misconceived the concept of diversity . . . . 
[. . . . yet] blacks and Mexican Americans are but two among any number of racial 
or ethnic groups that could and presumably should contribute to genuine diversity. 
 By singling out only those two ethnic groups, the initial stage of the law school’s 
1992 admissions process ignored altogether non-Mexican Hispanic Americans, 
Asian Americans, and Native Americans, to name but a few. 
Id. at 965-66; cf. Wright, supra  note 60, at 896 (writing that the Fifth Circuit could have found 
the law school’s admissions program unconstitutional on grounds that it was not narrowly 
tailored because “the law school’s use of separate admissions committees for minorities and 
nonminorities ‘insulated’ minority applicants from being considered with nonminority 
applicants”). 
128  Lauer, supra  note 114, at 123. 
129  Sweatt v. Painter, 329 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding that a parallel black law school was not 
“equal” to the University of Texas Law School).  For more discussion of the case, see supra 
note 123. 
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evidence of overt officially sanctioned discrimination at the University of Texas,”130 the 
Fifth Circuit misinterpreted and narrowed the Supreme Court’s position. The Court has 
held that “remedying specific acts of prior discrimination” is a compelling government 
interest provided the remedy is “narrowly tailored”.131  Hence, it was not necessary for 
the law school’s current administration to engage in discriminatory practices.132  The 
court should have found that remedying the effects of past discrimination was a 
compelling government interest for the law school and upheld that part of the 
admissions process which used race as one of many factors in reaching an admissions 
decision.133  
 
5.  After Hopwood 
 
There is little doubt that the Hopwood decision has refueled the debate over 
preferential admissions policies.134  However, the negative sentiment surrounding the 
                                                 
130  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 953 (“While the school once did practice de jure discrimination 
in denying admission to blacks, the Court in Sweatt v. Painter struck down the law school’s 
program.  Any other discrimination by the law school ended in the 1960's.”). 
131  STONE ET AL., supra note 23, at 691.  The authors write: “So long as a jurisdiction can 
point to specific prior acts of discrimination, whether public or private, for which it is in some 
sense responsible, ‘narrowly tailored’ race-conscious remedies are permissible.”  Id.  
132  By relying on Podberesky, the Fifth Circuit appears to have focused unduly on the 
present effects of past discrimination asserted by the law school.  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 952 
(“Next, the relevant governmental discriminator must prove that there are present effects of 
past discrimination of the type that justify the racial classifications at issue.”). 
Under the Hopwood appellate court’s formulation, affirmative action would only be 
permitted where the Law School’s practice of discrimination directly harmed the 
applicant by previously refusing that same applicant admission based on her race. . . 
.  In order for such a plan to have any practical application whatsoever, the 
institution employing the affirmative action plan would have to continue, in blatant 
violation of the law, to discriminate against the groups that it also intended to 
benefit through its plan. 
See Scanlan, supra  note 117, at 1605-06. (footnotes omitted). 
133  The long history of racial discrimination at the University of Texas would have been 
enough to support a remedial justification.  See Hopwood I, 861 F. Supp. at 555-57 and supra 
note 77.  However, even given a remedial justification for the law school’s admissions 
program, this author agrees with the district court that part of the admissions process was 
constitutionally impermissible because it “fail[ed] to afford each individual applicant a 
comparison with the entire pool of applicants, not just those of the applicant’s own race.”  Id. 
at 579. 
134  See Wright, supra  note 60, at 903.  “In sum, the general consensus among many 
commentators is that Hopwood has marked the beginning of the demise of affirmative action 
as it is currently being applied by colleges and universities nationwide.”  Id.; cf.  Caplan et al., 
supra  note 4, at 26-27.  “The Hopwood effect has at some institutions redoubled support for 
affirmative action. . . .  But in other institutions, Hopwood is changing policies through what 
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decision’s underlying reasoning may limit its legal impact.135  Hopwood is binding 
precedent on the Fifth Circuit states of Texas, Lousiana, and Mississippi only, and at 
least one education case outside the Fifth Circuit has declined to follow Hopwood.136  
                                                                                                                         
lawyers describe as ‘prudential’ actions taken to protect against the inevitable copycat suits.” 
 Id. 
135  See Barbara Bader Aldave, Hopwood v. Texas: Much Ado About Nothing?, TEX. LAW., 
Nov. 11, 1996, at 43 (writing as dean of St. Mary’s University School of Law in San Antonio). 
I can promise you this: Unless and until my superiors order me to stop, we at St. 
Mary’s University School of Law are going to ignore the Hopwood decision and 
adhere to the guidelines of Bakke.  I am immensely proud that 41 percent of the 
students in our first year class are members of minority groups, and that our school 
now has a higher percentage of Mexican-American students than any other law 
school in the Unites States.  At least as long as I am dean, St. Mary’s University 
School of Law will continue to turn out highly qualified lawyers, judges, legislators 
and public servants, and they will continue to come from all of the diverse racial and 
ethnic groups that make up our society. 
Id.  Aldave wrote further that “I hope many of you will join me in according to the Supreme 
Court the respect that it deserves, and in spreading the good news that the Bakke decision is 
still the law of the land.”  Id.  Aldave has been an outspoken critic of the Hopwood decision; 
in October 1997, the president of St. Mary’s declined to reappoint Aldave, who was law 
school dean for nine years.  Susan S. Richardson, Diversity Advocate Speaks Truth, Loses 
Job, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Oct. 31, 1997, at A15, available in 1997 WL 2844547. 
136  In Hunter v. Regents of the University of California, 971 F.Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1997), 
a mother brought an Equal Protection claim (among others) on behalf of her daughter who 
was denied admission to the four-year-old class of a UCLA laboratory school.  Id. at 1319.  
The school engaged in educational research in an attempt to develop a more effective 
education system for urban elementary students.  Id.  The admissions process admittedly 
treated applicants disparately by initially separating the applicants according to race and 
ethnicity.  Id. at 1323.  Applying strict scrutiny, the district court declined to follow Hopwood 
and other circuit courts which concluded that remedying past discrimination was the only 
permissible justification for racial classifications.  Id. at 3127.  The court wrote: 
The Court does not have an “abiding conviction” in the “reasonableness” of the 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ judgments, all of which base their holdings 
on an interpretation of Croson previously rejected by this Court.  In reliance upon the 
Supreme Court’s affirmation that strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in 
fact,” this Court cannot conclude that the only constitutional form of face-conscious 
decisionmaking must remedy past discrimination. 
Id.  Instead, the court recognized a compelling government interest in “maintaining and 
improving the public education system.”  Id. at 1328.  Due to the school’s innovative 
techniques and studies, “without a racially and ethnically diverse student population, the 
benefits to be gained by these innovations and studies would be lost.”  Id. at 1329.  The 
district court then concluded that the admissions process was narrowly tailored to meet the 
compelling government interest; thus, the school’s admissions process was constitutional.  
Id. at 1332.      
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Within the Fifth Circuit, Messer v. Meno137 extended Hopwood to the employment 
context, prompting one judge to express his reservations in a concurring opinion.138 
 
B.  Proposition 209 - The California Civil Rights Initiative  
 
While the Hopwood case was being decided in Texas, there was a movement 
underway in California to garner support for a state constitutional amendment.  On 
November 5, 1996, fifty-four percent of Californians voted to adopt Proposition 209,139 
otherwise known as the California Civil Rights Initiative.140  Proposition 209 prohibits 
discrimination and racial and gender preferences in public employment, public  
education, and public contracting.141  While supporters of the amendment touted the 
                                                 
137  130 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 1997).  In Messer, a white woman challenged the Texas Education 
Agency’s (“TEA”) affirmative action plans.  Id. at 133.  She alleged that during her 
employment at TEA, she had been “unconstitutionally discriminated against in salary and 
promotion opportunities” because “the agency aspired to ‘balance’ its workforce according 
to the gender and racial balance of the state.”  Id.  Citing Hopwood, the court found that there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether TEA employees considered race or gender 
in employment decisions.  Id. at 136, 139. As a result, the court reversed in large part TEA’s 
favorable summary judgment.  Id. at 133. 
138  Id. at 140 (Garza, J., specially concurring).  Judge Garza wrote: 
The majority is attempting to prove a bit too much in this case, with its rather 
sweeping dicta regarding the constitutionality and standards of review for 
affirmative action policies.  In doing so, it appears to me that the majority is 
attempting to quietly expand Hopwood’s empire into the realm of employment law 
with this decision, a move which is both hasty and unnecessary . . . . 
. . . I fear that the tone of the majority’s decision, coupled with its invocation of 
Hopwood, will send the message out that affirmative action is, for all intents and 
purposes, dead in the Fifth Circuit.  Such an interpretation would be incorrect under 
Supreme Court precedent and the precedent of this Circuit, and I write separately to 
make that point clear. 
Id. at 141.     
139  Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson (Wilson II), 122 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).  This case represented an appeal from a preliminary 
injunction handed down by the district court in response to a constitutional challenge to 
Proposition 209.  Id. at 697; see infra discussion in PART  III(B)(2). 
140  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; see CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, reprinted in Volokh, supra 
note 1, at 1397 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 209), where proponents of the 
constitutional amendment wrote that the name “California Civil Rights Initiative” was chosen 
because “it restates the historic Civil Rights Act . . . .”  Id.  Proponents reiterated that 
“[a]nyone opposed to Proposition 209 is opposed to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”  Id. at 1402 
(Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 209). 
141  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31, cl. a.  The text provides: 
The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.  
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benefits of returning to the nondiscrimination goals of earlier civil rights laws,142 
opponents claimed that “Proposition 209 highjacks civil rights language and uses legal 
lingo to gut protections against discrimination.”143 
 
1.  Proposition 209 Foreshadowed 
 
The passage of Proposition 209 was foreshadowed by an earlier affirmative action 
decision in California.  In July 1995, the Board of Regents of the University of 
California voted to discontinue the use of ethnicity and gender factors in admissions 
decisions beginning 1997.144  While it is still too early to gauge the effects of that 
                                                                                                                         
In Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson (Wilson I), 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (N.D. Cal. 
1996), vacated, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997), the district court 
wrote: “It is important to note at the outset that much of this language simply reaffirms 
existing anti-discrimination protections already provided by the United States and California 
Constitutions, and by the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”  Id.  Wilson I represented a constitutional 
challenge to Proposition 209 which was filed one day after voters approved the initiative.  
Wilson II, 122 F.3d at 697.  Infra discussion in PART  III(B)(2).  
142  See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, reprinted in Volokh, supra  note 1, at 1398 
(Argument in Favor of Proposition 209) (“Let’s not perpetuate the myth that ‘minorities’ and 
women cannot compete without special preferences.  Let’s instead move forward by returning 
to the fundamentals of our democracy: individual achievement, equal opportunity and zero 
tolerance for discrimination against--or for--any individual.”) (emphasis omitted).  
143  Id. at 1399 (Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 209).  Opponents claimed 
that “Proposition 209's real purpose is to eliminate affirmative action equal opportunity 
programs for qualified women and minorities including tutoring, outreach, and mentoring.”  
Id.  Opponents also claimed that politicians who supported Proposition 209 were using it as 
an opportunistic vehicle “for their own personal gain.”  Id.  Perhaps Proposition 209 should 
be given a narrow construction.  See Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: 
An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1997).  As such, it “does not ban ethnic 
studies majors, or repeal existing bans on sex discrimination, or prohibit all ‘affirmative action’ 
programs.”  Id. at 1337.  For example, an outreach program which recruits university 
applicants from schools which have historically had few applicants (regardless of ethnicity) 
would be permissible under Proposition 209; however, if the schools were targeted because 
they had more students of one particular group, the program would be discriminatory.  Id. at 
1352-53. 
144  See Thomas Glenn Martin, Jr., Comment, UCLA School of Law Admissions in the 
Aftermath of the U.C. Regents’ Resolution to Eliminate Affirmative Action: An Admissions 
Policy Survey and Proposal, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 150, 152 (writing that “[o]n July 20, 
1995, the history of affirmative action at the [University of California] took a dramatic and 
controversial turn”).  The Board of Regents’ decision came “[a]fter a turbulent twelve-hour 
meeting marked by a bomb threat, political grandstanding, and student demonstrations . . . .”  
Id.  See also  Arleen Jacobius, Affirmative Action on Way Out in California, 81-SEP A.B.A. J. 
22, 22 (1995) (“The regents’ action rings a death knell for affirmative action in state-supported 
law schools beginning January 1997 when the new policy takes effect, say deans and 
professors who opposed the change.”).  
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decision, the number of African Americans admitted to the University of California’s 
three law schools declined seventy-two percent last year.145  In response to the Board 
of Regents’ decision, supporters of affirmative action have developed new methods of 
ensuring minority representation.146 
 
2.  Judicial Challenge to Proposition 209  
 
The victory for supporters of Proposition 209 has been bittersweet.  One day after 
Proposition 209 was passed, the constitutionality of the initiative was challenged in 
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson.147  In a suit brought in United States District 
Court, the plaintiffs asserted that Proposition 209 interfered with their equal protection 
guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment of “the right to full participation in the 
political life of the community”148  by “restructur[ing] the political process in a 
nonneutral manner.”149  The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining state 
                                                 
145  Reibstein, supra  note 4, at 77.  Only fifty-nine African Americans were admitted to the 
three law schools.  Id.  Of that number, only sixteen decided to attend as compared to forty-
three the previous year.  Id.  At the University of California at Berkeley’s Boalt Hall, there is 
only one African American in the first-year class.  Id.   
146  See Jeffrey B. Wolff, Comment, Affirmative Action in College and Graduate School 
Admissions--The Effects of Hopwood and the Actions of the U.C. Board of Regents on its 
Continued Existence, 50 SMU L. REV. 627, 655 (1997).  Because the Board of Regents’ action 
was limited to university admissions, the schools still could target minorities at lower levels.  
At the University of California at Berkeley, a program called the Berkeley Pledge has been 
developed.  Id.  The Pledge is committed to identifying minority and low income elementary 
and high school students who may have potentia l to attend Berkeley.  Id.  The students will 
be offered such assistance as summer programs, professor mentoring, and recruiting in hopes 
that they will become eligible for admission to the University of California system.  Id. at 655-
56.  After the passage of Proposition 209, this program will have to use race- and gender- 
neutral means of identifying potential students.  In addition, Berkeley has revamped its 
admissions guidelines to both comply with the Board of Regent’s decision and still pursue a 
diverse student body through race- and gender-neutral means.  Id. at 656; For a discussion of 
alternative admissions policies which would comply with the Board of Regents’ action see 
Martin, supra  note 144.  The author favors a hybrid Diversity/Disadvantage admissions 
policy which addresses the concerns of race-based affirmative action without using race as a 
proxy.  Id. at 183.  “Diversity” refers to those subjective factors which “mold an individual’s 
character,” while “disadvantage” considers objective factors such as family and economic 
environment and education.  Id. at 181-82.  
147  Wilson I, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
148  Id. at 1489 (quoting Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982)). 
 The plaintiffs also argued that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Proposition 209 was preempted by Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and Title XI of the Education Amendments of 1972.  Id. at 1490.   
149  Id.  The plaintiffs’ specific allegation was that after Proposition 209, the only political 
means available for groups seeking legislation to benefit women or minorities was a 
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officials from implementing the amendment.150 
 
The District Court Decision 
 
The district court began by noting that much of the language contained in 
Proposition 209 “simply reaffirms existing anti-discrimination protections already 
provided by the United States and California Constitutions, and by the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.”151   At issue was that Californians clearly meant to do “something more” when 
they passed Proposition 209 than “simply restate existing law.”152  Relying on the 
plaintiffs’ political participation argument, the district court framed the issue in narrow 
terms: “[W]hether the particular method chosen by Proposition 209 to curtail 
affirmative action is unlawful because it . . . violates the rights of women and minorities 
to fully participate in our political system . . . ?”153 
                                                                                                                         
constitutional amendment.  Id.  The California Constitution could be amended in one of two 
ways: (1) By initiative constitutional amendment or (2) by legislative constitutional 
amendment.  Id. at 1498.  The district court noted that “[e]ither method places a heavy burden 
on those seeking to advocate the use of constitutionally-permissible affirmative action 
programs in their local communities.”  Id.  “In either case, substantial funds are required to 
organize and fund the statewide campaign that follows the initiative qualification procedure or 
requisite legislative approval.”  Id. at 1499.     
150  Id. at 1491.  In order to obtain a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs 
were required to show “either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the 
possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of 
hardships tips sharply in favor of the movant.”  Id. at 1492.  The district court had to evaluate 
the merits of the constitutional claim before it could address the irreparability and imminence 
of any harm.  Id. at 1493. 
151  Id. at 1488.  The court wrote that  “[t]his aspect of Proposition 209--which creates no 
change in existing law--is not at issue in this case.  Indeed, it could hardly be more clear that a 
law that merely affirms the non-discrimination principles in our Constitution is, itself, 
constitutional.”  Id.  
152  Id. at 1489.  The district court saw its role as determining the “outer boundaries” of the 
“something more.”  Id.  The challenge was not to the entire initiative, but only to “that slice of 
the initiative that now prohibits governmental entities at every level from taking voluntary 
action to remediate past and present discrimination through the use of constitutionally 
permissible race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs.”  Id. 
153  Id. at 1490.  The court wrote: 
It also cannot be overemphasized that this case does not call upon this Court to 
adjudicate whether affirmative action is right or wrong, or whether it is no longer an 
appropriate policy for addressing the continuing effects of past and present 
discrimination against racial minorities and women.  Such questions, while they are 
most certainly of vital public policy interest, lie beyond the purview of this Court.  
Nor does this case implicate the ability of governmental entities to voluntarily repeal 
affirmative action policies, as the Regents of the University of California did earlier 
this year. 
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The plaintiffs supported their equal protection claim with the Supreme Court cases 
of Hunter v. Erickson154 and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.155  These 
cases essentially held that an otherwise facially-neutral initiative is unconstitutional when 
it uses racial classifications to allocate government power non-neutrally.156  While the 
                                                                                                                         
Id. 
154  393 U.S. 385 (1969).  In Hunter, the city council in Akron, Ohio enacted a fair housing 
ordinance which the citizens subsequently amended by referendum.  Id. at 386-87.  The 
amendment provided that ordinances regulating real estate transactions “on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors 
voting on the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be 
effective.”  Id. at 387.  The effect of the amendment was that ordinances prohibiting racial or 
religious discrimination required both city council approval and a majority vote by the city’s 
citizens, whereas ordinances prohibiting discrimination on other grounds required only city 
council approval.  Id. at 390.  The Supreme Court struck down the charter amendment.  Id. at 
393.  The Court wrote: 
[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical 
manner, the reality is that the law’s impact falls on the minority.  The majority need 
no protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome 
but no more than that. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . .[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it 
more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or 
give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size. 
Id. at 391-93.  Thus, “the confluence of the two factors--the targeting of a racial issue and 
the reordering of the political process--constituted a racial classification that required the 
most exacting judicial scrutiny.”  Wilson I, 946 F. Supp. at 1500.  
155  458 U.S. 457 (1982).  The Supreme Court applied the Hunter rationale in Seattle to strike 
down a statewide initiative.  Id. at 470.  In Seattle, the Seattle School Board challenged the 
constitutionality of statewide Initiative 350 which prohibited school boards from requiring 
“any student to attend a school other than the school which is geographically nearest or next 
nearest the student’s place of residence . . . .”  Id. at 462.  The initiative contained a number of 
exceptions which permitted student reassignments for overcrowding, special education 
needs, and racial reasons if constitutionally mandated.   Id. at 462-63.  The effect of the 
initiative was to derail the Seattle School Board’s voluntary desegregation busing plan.  Id. at 
464.  The Supreme Court found that even though the initiative contained facially neutral 
language, in reality it barred only those busing plans aimed at racial desegregation.  Id. at 474. 
 In addition, the initiative reallocated political power in a non-neutral way.  Id.  “The initiative 
removes the authority to address a racial problem--and only a racial problem--from the existing 
decisionmaking body, in such a way to burden minority interests.”  Id.    
156  Id. at 483.  The Seattle Court wrote: 
Initiative 350, however, works something more than the “mere repeal” of a 
desegregation law by the political entity that created it.  It burdens all future 
attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts throughout the state, by 
lodging decision making authority over the question at a new and remote level of 
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“political majority may generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in 
the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of government action,”157 the 
racially-based initiatives in Hunter and Seattle failed because they did “not attempt[] to 
allocate government power on the basis of any general principle.”158 
 
The defendants maintained that Crawford v. Board of Education159 controlled.160  
Crawford involved an equal protection challenge to an amendment to the California 
Constitution which prohibited state court-ordered busing for desegregation unless a 
federal court would do so to remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation.161  The 
Supreme Court upheld the amendment by writing that  “the Equal Protection Clause is 
not violated by the mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies that were not 
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place.”162  The Court found that the 
amendment did not intend to discriminate on the basis of race nor did it distort the 
political process in a discriminatory manner.163  “In short, having gone beyond the 
                                                                                                                         
government. 
Id. 
157  Id. at 470 (“But a different analysis is required when the State allocates governmental 
power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the 
decisionmaking process.”).  
158  Hunter, 393 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J., concurring) (writing that “the city of Akron has not 
attempted to allocate governmental power on the basis on any general principle,” but rather 
the “provision . . . has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain racial and 
religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their interest”). 
159  458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
160  Wilson I, 946 F. Supp. at 1508.  The defendants distinguished Proposition 209 from 
Hunter and Seattle in several ways.  Id. at 1502-03.  One argument was that while Hunter and 
Seattle burdened the equal protection rights of minorities, Proposition 209, by contrast, “only 
interferes with ‘zero-sum’ antidiscrimination efforts--those that help minorities, but do so at 
the expense of nonminorities.”  Id. at 1502.  The district court rejected the arguments.  Id. at 
1502-03.  
161  Crawford , 458 U.S. at 527.  Previously, the California Supreme Court had interpreted 
the state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting both de jure and de facto 
segregation and ordered state school boards to take “reasonable steps to alleviate 
segregation in the public schools.”  Id. at 530.  Efforts for the constitutional amendment were 
motivated, in part, by dissatisfaction with the California Supreme Court’s decision.  Id. at 531-
32.  It was in this context  that the United States Supreme Court found the amendment to be a 
“mere repeal.”  Id. at 538.  
162  Id. at 538.  The Court wrote: “Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race-related 
legislation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the authority of States to deal with the 
problems of our heterogeneous population.  State would be committed irrevocably to 
legislation that has proved unsuccessful or even harmful in practice.”  Id. at 539. 
163  Id. at 537.  The Court found that the amendment “neither says nor implies that persons 
are to be treated differently on account of their race.”  Id.  The chief benefit of the amendment, 
neighborhood schooling, was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory objective.  Id. at 545.  In 
33
Anderson: The Erosion of Affirmative Action
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
requirements of the Federal Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the 
standard prevailing generally throughout the United States.”164 
 
The district court rejected Crawford as controlling in this case; “Proposition 209 
[could not] be characterized as a mere repeal.”165  Instead, the court applied the Hunter-
Seattle rationale166 to find that Proposition 209 had both a racial focus167 and 
restructured the political process “to the detriment of the interests of minorities and 
women.”168  Consequently, the district court granted the preliminary injunction.169 
                                                                                                                         
addition, the Court found no discriminatory reallocation of political power.  Id. at 541.  The 
Court wrote the “[r]emedies appropriate in one area of legislation may not be desirable in 
another” and “ ‘the Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion 
to be treated in law as though they were the same.’ ” Id. at 541-42 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 
310 U.S. 141 (1940)).         
164  Id. at 542.  The Court rejected the notion that once a state chooses to do more than 
constitutionally required under the Fourteenth Amendment, “it may never recede.”  Id. at 535. 
 “We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so destructive of a State’s 
democratic processes and of its ability to experiment.”  Id. 
165  Wilson I, 946 F. Supp. at 1508 (“Proposition 209 . . . not only repeals all existing state 
and local affirmative action programs, but also prohibits the adoption of such programs in the 
future.”).  
166  Id. at 1504.  From the outset, the district court noted three similarities between 
Proposition 209 and the initiatives struck down in  Seattle and Hunter:   
All three initiatives are facially neutral.  All three grew from controversial efforts 
aimed at rolling back legislative gains that were intended as remedies for historical 
discrimination suffered by particular groups.  Perhaps most importantly, in the wake 
of all three measures, those seeking to reenact such remedies could no longer use 
the same political mechanisms that had been available prior to the passage of the 
enactments. 
Id. at 1501. 
167  Id. at 1504.  The court relied on both Proposition 209’s campaign and its practical effect 
to conclude that despite its facial neutrality, Proposition 209 singled out race- and gender-
conscious affirmative action programs.  Id.  The initiative was repeatedly characterized as a 
“referendum on race- and gender- conscious affirmative action,” and its practical effect 
“would eliminate existing state and local race- and gender-conscious affirmative action efforts 
in contracting, employment, and education.”  Id.      
168  Id. at 1506.  While both racial and gender classifications were at issue in Proposition 
209, the district court did not apply strict scrutiny, because it concluded that the initiative 
failed to satisfy even the lesser intermediate scrutiny triggered by the gender classification.  
Id. at 1508.  Under intermediate scrutiny, the state has the burden of showing that the 
challenged classification serves an “important government purpose” and that the means are 
“substantially related” to the achievement of that purpose.  Id. at 1509.  After subjecting the 
“reordering of the political process” to intermediate scrutiny, the court held that Proposition 
209 as a means of eliminating discrimination on the basis of race and gender could not survive 
intermediate scrutiny.  Id.  “Defendants have not identified any feature of the prior political 
process that was discriminatory, and thus their invocation of a state interest in eliminating 
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The Ninth Circuit Decision 
 
The Ninth Circuit began by defining the court’s role as reviewing whether the 
district court relied on any erroneous legal premises in terms of “conventional” equal 
protection analysis or “political structure” equal protection analysis.170  The court 
concluded that under “conventional” equal protection analysis, “there is simply no doubt 
that Proposition 209 is constitutional.”171  The court  then addressed the “political 
structure” analysis by reviewing the district court’s reliance on the Hunter-Seattle 
rationale.172  The Ninth Circuit distinguished Proposition 209 from Hunter and Seattle 
by finding that the initiative addressed race-related and gender-related matters in a 
“neutral-fashion.”173  In addition, the court wrote: “Impediments to preferential 
                                                                                                                         
discrimination cannot justify the nonneutral reordering of that process.”  Id.  
169  Id. at 1520.  Thus, the plaintiffs demonstrated that a preliminary injunction was 
necessary to protect them from irreparable injury.  Id.  The district court also concluded that 
Proposition 209 was invalid because it was preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Wilson II, 122 F.3d at 709. 
170  Wilson II, 122 F.3d at 701.  The court defined “conventional” equal protection analysis 
as “look[ing] to the substance of the law at issue” and “political structure” equal protection 
analysis as “look[ing] to the level of government at which the law was enacted.”  Id. 
171  Id.  The court wrote: “The first step in determining whether a law violates the Equal 
Protection Clause is to identify the classification that it draws.”  Id. at 702.  The court 
concluded that “[a] law that prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender 
a fortiori does not classify individuals by race or gender.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded, “as a matter of law and logic,” that Proposition 209 did not violate 
“conventional” equal protection analysis.  Id.  
172  Id. at 704.  The State advanced two arguments to contend that the district court 
erroneously relied on Hunter and Seattle. Id.  First, unlike Hunter and Seattle, Proposition 
209 “does not reallocate political authority in a discriminatory manner.”  Id.  Second, “a 
majority of the electorate cannot restructure the political process to discriminate against 
itself.”  Id.  Addressing the second argument first, the court accepted the district court’s 
findings that Proposition 209 would indeed burden members of minority groups within the 
majority who enacted the initiative by making race- or gender-based preferential treatment 
unavailable at the local entity level.  Id. at 705.  The court wrote: “The legal question for us to 
decide is whether a burden on achieving race-based or gender-based preferential treatment 
can deny individuals equal protection of the laws.”  Id.       
173  Id. at 709.  The court wrote that Hunter and Seattle “relied expressly on the states’ 
existing . . . processes to find that they had reallocated authority in a racially discriminatory 
manner.”  Id. at 706. 
When, in contrast, a state prohibits all its instruments from discriminating 
against or granting preferential treatment to anyone on the basis of race or gender, it 
has promulgated a law that addresses in neutral-fashion race-related and gender-
related matters.  It does not isolate race or gender antidiscrimination laws from any 
specific area over which the state has delegated authority to a local entity.  Nor does 
35
Anderson: The Erosion of Affirmative Action
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
treatment do not deny equal protection. . . .  While the Constitution protects against 
obstructions to equal treatment, it erects obstructions to preferential treatment by its 
own terms.”174  Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “as a matter of law, Proposition 
209 does not violate the United States Constitution.”175   
 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing was denied and a suggestion for 
rehearing en banc was rejected.176  On November 3, 1997, the United States Supreme 
Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in a memorandum.177 
 
Analysis 
 
Wilson I and Wilson II are perfect examples of how the framing of an issue can 
greatly affect the outcome of a case.  Wilson I framed the issue in terms of Proposition 
209 interfering with the plaintiffs’ equal protection rights of access to the political 
process.178  When the Wilson II court reviewed the district court’s decision, it focused 
on the political access burden in the context of interfering with preferential treatment.179 
                                                                                                                         
it treat race and gender antidiscrimination laws in one area differently from race and 
gender antidiscrimination laws in another.  Rather, it prohibits all race and gender 
preferences by state entities. 
Id. at 707. 
174  Id. at 708.  The court distinguished equal treatment from preferential treatment.  Id.  “It 
is one thing to say that individuals have equal protection rights against political obstructions 
to equal treatment; it is quite another to say that individuals have equal protection rights 
against political obstructions to preferential treatment.”  Id. 
175  Id. at 710.  The court wrote: “[W]e are persuaded that the district court relied on an 
erroneous legal premise when it concluded that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of 
success on their equal protection claim.”  Id. at 709.  The court reached the same conclusion 
when it reviewed the district court’s decision that “plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the 
merits of their pre-emption claims.”  Id. at 710. 
176  Id. at 711. Circuit Judge Schroeder, joined by three members of the court, wrote a 
dissent in which he contended that “[e]n banc review was warranted in this case for two 
reasons.”  Id.  (Schroeder, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  “First, the case is 
extraordinarily important.”  Id.  He maintained that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “put equal 
protection law in a state of turmoil.”  Id.  “Second, the decision is contrary to controlling 
Supreme Court precedent.”  Id.  Judge Schroder wrote that Hunter and Seattle applied to 
Proposition 209.  Id.  “The Supreme Court has squarely held that a state violates the 
Constitution when it attempts to put legislative remedies which benefit minorities at a remote 
level of government beyond the ordinary legislative process.”  Id.      
177  Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson (Wilson III), 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997). 
178  Wilson I, 946 F. Supp. at 1489.  See also  Weeden, supra  note 15, at 304 (“The most 
serious flaw in Wilson [I]’s analysis is the failure to treat Proposition 209 as an affirmative 
action remedy based on race and gender, but instead treating it as a case about access to the 
political process.”).   
179  Wilson II, 122 F.3d at 705.  The Wilson II court wrote: “The legal question for us to 
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 Therefore, “Proposition 209 is constitutional because it prevents racial and gender 
discrimination by denying preferences not otherwise allowed under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”180 
 
Under the Wilson I formulation, Proposition 209 clearly impedes the right of access 
to the political process by permitting race- and gender-based remedies only through a 
constitutional mechanism.181  However, Proposition 209 is only unconstitutional if there 
is the necessary “intent to discriminate.”182  In this case, the initiative was facially 
neutral, and even though it had a disproportionate impact on women and minorities, it 
would be unconstitutional only if it were enacted “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” 
its adverse effects on women and minorities.183  The district court erred in finding the 
requisite discriminatory purpose.184  Even though Proposition 209 removes 
                                                                                                                         
decide is whether a burden on achieving race-based or gender-based preferential treatment 
can deny individuals equal protection of the laws.”  Id. 
180  Weeden, supra note 15, at 304.  The Ninth Circuit wrote that the plaintiffs challenge  
Proposition 209 “not as an impediment to protection against unequal treatment but as an 
impediment to receiving preferential treatment.”  Wilson II, 122 F. 3d at 709.  This critical 
distinction enabled the Wilson II court to find that “[t]he alleged ‘equal protection’ burden 
that Proposition 209 imposes on those who would seek race and gender preferences is a 
burden that the Constitution itself imposes.”  Id. at 708. 
181  Wilson I, 946 F. Supp. at 1490.  The district court found that either of the two ways of 
amending the California Constitution imposed a “heavy burden” on groups seeking 
legislation to benefit women or minorities.  Id.  at 1498.  
182  Intent to discriminate, defined as intent to treat a particular group differently, is a 
critical element in equal protection analysis.  For a discussion of equal protection analysis, 
see supra note 30. 
183  Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (upholding a 
Massachusetts law considering veterans who qualified for state civil service positions ahead 
of qualifying nonveterans because the purpose of the law was not to exc lude women).  For a 
discussion of equal protection analysis, see supra  note 30. 
184  The district court relied on Proposition 209's campaign and its practical effect to 
conclude that Proposition 209 singled out race- and gender-conscious affirmative action 
programs.  Wilson I, 946 F. Supp. at 1504.  But the court did not take the inquiry far enough to 
ask whether the initiative, despite its disproportionate impact to women and minorities, was 
enacted “because of,” and not merely “in spite of” its disproportionate impact.  If it had, the 
district court would not have applied a heightened scrutiny standard of review.  See Weeden, 
supra note 15, at 316 (“A state remains free to restructure the political process, in the absence 
of an illicit state action through a neutral method, even where such change incidentally 
burdens the political participation of women and minorities”).  Like the Wilson II court, the 
author distinguishes Proposition 209 from Hunter and Seattle.  Id. at 312.  “Proposition 209 is 
neither an obvious nor subtle pretext for gender . . . discrimination.”  Id.  “[I]t was enacted in 
spite of its impact on race and gender.”  Id. at 313.  For a discussion of equal protection 
analysis, see supra  note 30. 
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decisionmaking authority to “a new and remote level of government,”185  the initiative 
was enacted to return to the core values of treating all persons equally under the Equal 
Protection Clause, not to treat women and minorities differently.186  As the Wilson II 
court noted, “Every statewide policy has the ‘procedural’ effect of denying someone an 
inconsistent outcome at the local level.”187 
 
The Ninth Circuit reached the correct decision by relying on Crawford and 
distinguishing Proposition 209 from Hunter and Seattle.  “Like Crawford, California 
voters in adopting Proposition 209 merely repealed state laws passed by state and local 
entities granting race- or gender-based preferences which exceeded the minimum 
protection required under federal law.”188      
 
C.  Gratz v. Michigan 
                                                 
185  Seattle, 458 U.S. at 483. 
186  Weeden, supra  note 15, at 305. 
Proposition 209 does not inhibit enforcement of any federal law or constitutional 
requirement for race or gender-based affirmative action.  To the contrary, the real 
focus of Proposition 209 is to embrace the requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause with respect to gender- and race-based governmental affirmative action 
policies. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
187  Wilson II, 122 F.3d at 706.  Justice Scalia makes a similar observation is his dissenting 
opinion in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630-31 (1996) (striking down an amendment to 
Colorado’s Constitution which prohibited the state or any of its agencies from enacting 
legislation which gave homosexuals minority status, preferences, protected status, or claim to 
discrimination). 
The central thesis of the Court’s reasoning is that any group is denied equal 
protection when, to obtain advantage (or, presumably, to avoid disadvantage), it 
must have recourse to a more general and hence more difficult level of political 
decisionmaking than others.  The world has never heard of such a principle, which is 
why the Court’s opinion is so long on emotive utterance and so short on relevant 
legal citation.  And it seems to me most unlikely that any multilevel democracy can 
function under such a principle.  For whenever a disadvantage is imposed, or 
conferral of a benefit is prohibited, at one of the higher levels of democratic 
decisionmaking (i.e., by the state legislature rather than local government, or by the 
people at large in the state constitution rather than the legislature), the affected 
group has (under this theory) been denied equal protection. . . .  It is ridiculous to 
consider this a denial of equal protection, which is why the Court’s theory is 
unheard-of. 
Id.  (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
188  Weeden, supra note 15, at 298.  The author writes: “Because there is no illicit 
governmental motive behind the passage of Proposition 209, and because voters were 
seemingly motivated by a desire to govern impartially, Proposition 209 passes the rational 
basis test.”  Id. 
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In the aftermath of Hopwood, fears of copycat lawsuits seem to have been realized 
in the latest challenge to university admissions policies.189  In Michigan, two white 
applicants rejected by the University of Michigan are challenging the school’s apparent 
use of different and lower admissions criteria for minorities.190  Supporting the 
plaintiffs’ claims are university documents obtained by a University of Michigan 
philosophy professor through the Freedom of Information Act.191  The school 
responded that race is just one of a number of factors it considers in its admissions 
decisions.192  Opponents of affirmative action are hoping that Gratz will be “The Case” 
which makes it to the Supreme Court.193  Many of the critics still favor student body 
diversity, but they favor alternative means of accomplishing that goal.194 
 
IV.  THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 
 
Hopwood, Proposition 209, and Gratz are examples of the continuing debate over 
                                                 
189  Caplan et al., supra  note 4, at 27 (writing that after Hopwood, some universities 
changed their admissions policies “through what lawyers describe as ‘prudential’ actions 
taken to protect against the inevitable copycat suits”).  
190  Cohen, supra  note 16, at 52.  The lawsuit was initiated by Center for Individual Rights 
(“CIR”), a Washington-based public-interest organization “which litigates on behalf of a 
variety of conservative causes.”  Id.  With some help from four Republican state legislators, 
CIR assembled a pool of white applicants who were rejected from the University of Michigan, 
and the two named plaintiffs were chosen.  Id. at 53.  This is a description of lead plaintiff 
Jennifer Gratz: 
The lead plaintiff, Jennifer Gratz, is the kind of student any college would want to 
admit.  A policeman’s daughter who attended public school in a working-class 
Detroit suburb, Gratz had a 3.76 GPA in high school and scored a 25 on the ACT, the 
college-admissions test that serves as an alternative to the SAT.  She was a math 
tutor, a blood-drive organizer, a volunteer at her school’s “senior citizens’ prom,” a 
cheerleader and homecoming queen.  Gratz had once hoped to become a doctor, but 
when she was turned down at Ann Arbor and forced to attend a less selective state 
school, she gave it up. 
Id.  The plaintiffs contend that the admissions policy unconstitutionally discriminated against 
them on racial grounds.  Reibstein, supra  note 4, at 76.  
191   Cohen, supra  note 16, at 52.  The professor, Carl Cohen, obtained copies of the 
university’s charts and grids which are used in making admissions decisions.  Id.  There are 
“[f]requent references to the race of applicants, and apparent use of different and lower 
selection criteria . . . .”  Id. 
192  Cohen, supra  note 16, at 54.  Among the other factors considered by the university are 
high school grades, test scores, in-state residency, rural location, and whether parents are 
school alumni.  Id.    
193  Id. 
194  Id.  Critics favor alternatives which don’t create different standards for different races 
such as outreach programs.  Id. 
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affirmative action and preferential admissions policies.  The two principal justifications 
offered for affirmative action in university admissions are remedying the effects of past 
discrimination and achieving student body diversity.195  Underlying both these 
justifications is the notion of “leveling the playing field” for minorities; the difficulty 
arises in deciding how to go about this task.196  While one group vehemently believes 
that race and ethnicity must be taken into account,197 another group believes a “color-
                                                 
195  See Richard A. Epstein, Affirmative Action in Law Schools: The Uneasy Truce, 2 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 39 (1992) (finding that “two general classes of justifications can be used 
for affirmative action,” but that each one “is incomplete”). 
The first of these classes regards affirmative action as a system of rectification for 
past systematic wrongs, and thereby employs the language of corrective justice for 
the redress of grievances.  The second of these classes puts aside the issue of past 
wrongs, and argues on a forward-looking basis that affirmative action, now labeled 
diversity, is necessary for the good of the institution at large. 
Id.; cf. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Getting Beyond Racial Preferences: The Class-Based 
Compromise, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 721, 726 (1996) (writing that “in response to the political and 
legal assaults on affirmative action, proponents of preference programs have developed two 
new sets of arguments to supplement the old compensatory justification”). First, proponents 
claim racial preferences “are necessary to prevent ongoing racial discrimination,” and second, 
“preferences are necessary to promote diversity.”  Id.  The author finds neither justification 
entirely satisfactory, preferring instead a class-based system which gives consideration to 
economic disadvantage.  Id. at 728.  But see Rubenfeld, supra  note 61, at 472 (“In fact, the 
true, core objective of race-based affirmative action is nothing other than helping blacks.  
Friends of affirmative action, if there are any left, should acknowledge this objective, and they 
should embrace it--in the name of justice.”). 
196  See Martin, supra note 144, at 154 (illustrating the opposing views on affirmative 
action with a relay race example). 
In the race for degrees of higher education, opponents and proponents of 
affirmative action have contrary opinions as to where the sprinters should place 
their starting blocks.  Opponents of affirmative action believe that all the starting 
blocks should be placed along a straight line, giving each sprinter an equal chance 
at victory. . . .  
Proponents of affirmative action disagree, noting that whites have had the inside 
track for many years. 
Id.; cf. Mills, Introduction, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 7 (writing 
about President Lyndon Johnson’s commencement speech at Howard University in June 
1965). 
Johnson began his speech by celebrating the degree to which racial barriers were 
being knocked down.  Quickly, however, the President changed his tone.  “But 
freedom is not enough,” he told his Howard audience.  “You do not take a person 
who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the 
starting line of a race and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all others’ and still 
justly believe you have been completely fair.” 
Id. 
197  In Bakke, Justice Blackmun wrote: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
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blind” approach is the only acceptable path to equality.198 
 
A.  For and Against the Diversity Rationale 
 
In the context of preferential admissions policies, the diversity rationale receives 
perhaps the most attention.  Proponents of racial diversity extol the virtues of 
interacting and sharing viewpoints with individuals of diverse backgrounds and 
cultures.199  They claim diversity beneficiaries can serve as role models and sources of 
                                                                                                                         
account of race.  There is no other way.  And in order to treat some persons equally, we must 
treat them differently.”  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).   
Regardless of which varieties of affirmative action we might personally favor or 
disfavor, no discussion of the alternatives is likely to prove fruitful unless we agree 
at the outset that race and ethnicity must be taken into account . . . if we are to 
achieve genuine diversity in our universities and law schools. 
See Barbara Bader Aldave, Affirmative Action: Reminiscences, Reflections, and Ruminations, 
23 S.U. L. REV. 121, 126 (1996). 
198   See Kahlenberg, supra note 195, at 723 (“Publicly, both sides of the mainstream 
affirmative action debate profess to want color-blindness in the end; there is disagreement, 
however, over the means to achieving that agreed upon goal.”); see also  Jody David Armour, 
Hype and Reality in Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1997) (“Conservatives 
have enjoyed spectacular success in portraying post-civil rights America as practically color-
blind. . . .  The problem with both the color-blind America and reverse discrimination 
contentions is  that their proponents fail to support them empirically, opting instead for 
groundless pronouncements and naked assertions.”).  Proponents of color-blindness trace 
the concept back to Justice Harlan’s dissent in  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”).  But see John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and 
Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 316 (1994) 
(writing that what Justice Harlan meant by color-blind is not entirely clear “given the 
extremely color-conscious language that precedes his statement”).  Justice Harlan wrote: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power.  So, I doubt not, it 
will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to 
principles of constitutional liberty. 
Id. (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  The author writes that “[n]ot 
surprisingly, advocates of colorblindness usually exclude this language when they quote 
Justice Harlan.”  Id.   The author asserts that Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion contains an 
implicit ambiguity of race such as how to group individuals into races and which groups 
affirmative action programs should help.  Id. at 317.  Proponents of a color-blind society 
attempt to dispel this ambiguity of race by “forget[ing] the existence of race.”  Id. at 319.  
199  See Lacey, supra  note 48, at 112 (“The cornerstone of diversity is the idea that an 
individual’s background affects how he will perceive issues and ideas.  Only by insuring that 
the student body is comprised of diverse individuals can a university achieve its ‘intellectual 
mission’ of ‘a multiplicity of intellectual perspectives.’”); Sheila Foster, Difference and 
Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of “Diversity”, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 105, 138-39 
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inspiration for the next generation of potential students; in addition, the minority 
community as a whole may benefit.200  Other individuals support racial diversity from a 
purely moral perspective simply because they feel it is the “right” thing to do.201  
 
Opponents of preferential admissions policies as a means to diversity cite the 
negative effects of a “bifurcated student body,” stigmatization of minority students, and 
resentment among different races.202  Some opponents argue that the benefits of 
preferential admissions policies have run their course and are no longer necessary.203  
                                                                                                                         
(1993): 
In educational settings, the diversity principle has been developed as a means to 
promote educational excellence through exposure to a wide variety of viewpoints 
and ideas in the classroom and in scholarship. . . . 
. . . Moreover, the benefits of such diversity are deemed to extend not only to 
members of those under-represented minority groups who benefit from the policies 
at issue, but also to the majority recipients of such viewpoints. 
Id.;  Aldave, supra note 197, at 128 (writing that beneficiaries of diversity “will be largely 
immune to the stereotyping that can poison our attitudes toward each other and our 
relationships with each other.”).  
200  See Lacey, supra  note 48, at 112-13. 
The benefits of diversity are not limited to creating an atmosphere comprised of 
diverse intellectual perspectives. . . .  The success of an individual minority member 
has the potential of creating a “multiplier effect” which can extend benefits to an 
entire minority group. . . .  An individual’s success can create an infusion of capital 
for minority businesses and organizations.  A successful member of a minority 
community may have the opportunity to start or invest in a new business, which in 
turn may employ other minorities living in the community. . . .  The net result is that a 
success of one member of the community can be multiplied throughout the entire 
neighborhood. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
201  See Aldave, supra  note 197, at 130 (“I now find myself quite satisfied with the diversity 
rationale for affirmative action.  But, at bottom, my instincts still tell me that we ought to 
support affirmative action because it is right.”). 
202  Wolff, supra  note 146, at 637 (writing that a bifurcated student body often results 
when law schools use lower and different admissions criteria for minorities).  This, in turn, 
negates the benefits of diversity and causes resentment and stigmatization of minorities by 
others questioning their credentials.  Id.; see Lacey, supra note 48, at 118 (“The problem is 
not preferential admissions per se, but rather, those programs which, in an effort to admit 
certain minorities, have lowered academic standards to the point where students who are 
admitted are not academically prepared to compete.”).  The author writes that the stigma 
created by admitting minority students with significantly lower academic credentials often 
leads to “the best black syndrome.”  Id. at 114.  This is the idea that the best black applicant is 
still not as smart as the best white applicant, and therefore, can only compete with other 
blacks.  Id.  “Instead of being simply the best, she is the best black or other minority person.” 
 Id. 
203  See Lacey, supra note 48, at 108 (writing in response to critics’ predictions that the end 
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Others reject the idea that diversity can be achieved by assuming a minority group can 
be “lumped into a single ‘viewpoint’” or that every successful minority is qualified to 
speak on behalf of an entire group of people.204 
 
B.  Alternatives to Racial Diversity 
 
Some critics of the diversity rationale believe that admissions decisions should be 
based exclusively on merit.205  Under a merit principle, “people get what they ‘deserve’-
                                                                                                                         
of preferential admissions will also mean the end of university diversity). 
[P]erhaps the time has come when we as a nation must trust that the lessons of the 
past have been learned and that institutions of higher learning will continue to seek 
diversity in their student body . . . without mandatory affirmative action policies.  To 
argue that bigotry and racial discrimination no longer exist is clearly no one’s 
contention; but like thievery and other crimes, one can never totally eradicate it 
despite laws against it. 
Id.; cf. Kahlenberg , supra  note 195, at 726 (“There can be no doubt that racial discrimination 
remains a continuing tragedy in our society. . . . The continued existence of racism, however, 
does not and cannot justify broad-based racial preference schemes.”);  see also Racial Chasm 
Continues to Grow Wider, Report Says, THE VINDICATOR, March 1, 1998, at A1 (writing that a 
report released by a private urban policy group, the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 
concludes that “the economic and racial divide in the United States not only has materialized, 
it’s getting wider.”). 
204  Lacey, supra note 48, at 112.  
The foundation upon which diversity has been built is also the very behavior that 
diversity is designed to eliminate, the stereotyping of an individual by his race.  The 
cornerstone of diversity has always been the idea that minority groups can be 
pigeonholed, with experiences and ideas that are predictably different from the 
majority, and because of an individual’s minority identity he necessarily will view 
things differently than the white majority.  But when the views of minority groups 
turn out to be the same as the majority then the argument for race as a proxy for 
diversity collapses. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
205  But see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Address at Loyola Law School (Jan. 17, 1997), in 30 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1447,  1459 (1997) (discussing the word “merit” in affirmative action). 
Let’s face it.  The much-extolled word “merit” has only a serendipitous connection 
with making it.  If we as a society truly valued merit, you would not have the 
governor you have, we would not have the President we have, and the make-up of 
our leadership in every area would be far different--and certainly far better--than it is. 
 Indeed, outside the affirmative action debate, you virtually never hear the word. . . . 
 In short, the phony pennant of merit serves as the false banner of color-blindness, 
used as justification for opposition to affirmative action. 
Id.  The lecturer maintains that society is always willing to sacrifice the rights of African 
Americans to protect either economic or political interests of whites.  Id. at 1452.  Likewise, 
the only time that society and law do recognize the rights of minorities is when it “serves 
some economic or political interests of greater importance to whites.”  Id.  For example, “[i]n 
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-no more, no less” as determined by accurate, neutral standards.206  In higher 
education, this standard is often standardized test scores.207  The merit principle 
presents at least two difficulties: 1) Minorities consistently underperform on 
standardized tests,208 and 2) the pervasiveness of legacy admissions (children of 
alumni) is in direct conflict with a meritocracy concept.209 
                                                                                                                         
the early 1970s, a great many corporations, government agencies, and educational institutions 
decided that affirmative action programs were a relatively inexpensive response to the urban 
rebellions, particularly those sparked by Martin Luther King’s assassination.”  Id. at 1453.  
However, as the job market tightened, whites became anxious about their own well-being and 
began to oppose affirmative action programs.  Id.  Likewise, politicians evaded economic 
problems by putting the blame on affirmative action programs.  Id.; cf. Aldave, supra note 197, 
at 127 (writing that the arguments of those who support a merit system “are not frivolous.  
But neither do they establish that affirmative action is misguided, unlawful, or immoral.  
Rather, they suggest that affirmative action must be justified”).  
206  Armour, supra note 198, at 1186.  The author terms the merit principle the “just deserts 
model” writing that “[a] person’s deserts . . . are supposedly determined on the basis of 
certain standards and approaches carefully calculated to gauge deserts.”  Id.   
207  Id.  The standardized score, in turn, “serve as a primary basis for allocating educational 
positions and other scarce opportunities.”  Id.; cf. Epstein, supra note 195, at 37 (writing that 
traditional merit variables include grades, boards [standardized test scores], letters of 
recommendation, and interviews).  
208  Aldave, supra  note 197, at 126 (“The sad truth is that the members of some racial and 
ethnic groups earn much lower scores on standardized tests, on the average, than do the 
members of other racial and ethnic groups.”); see Armour, supra  note 198, at 1186-87.  The 
author writes about the psychological phenomenon of “stereotype vulnerability” which tends 
to diminish the performance of African American test takers.  Id.  Claude Steele, a Stanford 
social psychologist, gave two groups of African American and white Stanford students the 
same test containing difficult verbal skills questions from the Graduate Record Exam.  Id. at 
1187.  One group was told that the purpose of the test was just to explore different 
psychological factors entailed in solving verbal problems, while the other group was told that 
the test was a measure of their true verbal abilities.  Id.  Whites performed equally in both 
situations.  Id.  The African Americans who thought they were merely solving verbal 
problems performed as well as the whites.  Id.  However, the group of African Americans 
“saddled with the extra burden of believing that the test measured their intelligence scored 
significantly below all the other students.”  Id.  Steele theorizes that the group performed 
poorly because they worked too quickly or inefficiently while trying to avoid a negative 
stereotype.  Id.   
209  See Schimmel, supra  note 86, at 1066 (writing about prohibiting racial preferences in 
admissions policies while allowing preferences for children of alumni, donors, or politicians). 
A narrow, legalistic answer is that the Fourteenth Amendment usually has been 
interpreted to prohibit discrimination based on race, but not to prohibit 
discrimination in favor of children of wealthy or well-connected parents.  This, of 
course, only illustrates the fact that a customary practice can be both legal and 
unfair. 
Id.  The author states that universities should seriously consider banning alumni and similar 
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Another alternative to race-based preferential admissions policies is class-based 
preferences based on economic disadvantage.  Proponents of class-based preferences 
believe this response provides a remedy for past discrimination210 but avoids the 
“divisive potential of racial preferences.”211  Opponents question the efficacy of a class-
based admissions process212 and dismiss the notion as just another example of 
Americans denying the impact of race.213 
 
                                                                                                                         
preferences to avoid the appearance of a double standard.  Id. 
Alumni preferences, like racial preferences, are genetically determined, having 
nothing to do with the individual effort or character of the applicant, and should be 
abolished.  It is a sign of the decline of the moral authority of the civil rights 
movement when one of its arguments for racial preferences is that they are no worse 
then alumni preferences. 
Kahlenberg , supra note 195, at 728. 
210  Id. at 724. 
Providing preferences to disadvantaged people generally is at once color-blind 
and cognizant of our nation’s history.  As a result of slavery and segregation, 
blacks remain disproportionately poor and would disproportionately benefit from a 
class-based preference to the extent that the economic legacy of the past remains.  
The means themselves, however, would be color--blind, thereby obviating the 
legitimate argument of many whites that there is not a scientific causal link between 
past discrimination against a group and the provision of a preference to individual 
members of that group some time later. 
Id.  
211  Kahlenberg, supra  note 195, at 726.  But see Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based 
Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs After Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, 
or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1289, 1309 (1997) (“[T]o the extent that any preference 
system includes some groups and excludes others, all preferences can be expected to have 
divisive effects on society as a whole.”).  The author writes that “policymakers have 
disguised racially motivated preferences by substituting socioeconomic disadvantage for 
racial identity as the basis for the preference.”  Id. at 1293.  
212  See Schimmel, supra  note 86, at 1065 (writing that if Justice Brennan’s statistics in 
Bakke are similar today, a class-based preference alternative would be ineffective because 
“whites outnumber minorities at every socioeconomic level,” and economic disadvantage 
does not correlate with differences in standardized test scores).  The author points out, 
however, that the ineffectiveness of  a class-based preference could be mitigated by 
universities decreasing their emphasis on standardized test scores and grade point averages 
while giving more weight to economic disadvantage.  Id.  
213  Frederick A. Morton, Jr., Note, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Another Illustration of 
America Denying the Impact of Race, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1993) (writing that 
“America continues to find ways to avoid dealing with the questions of race” and class-
based affirmative action is but one example of this avoidance).  The author opposes class-
based affirmative action, in part, from an original intent viewpoint in “that there is simply no 
basis for arguing that affirmative action was designed to combat indigence.”  Id. at 1125.     
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C.  Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
1.  The Ultimate Goal 
 
Student body diversity214 is undeniably a positive force in any university 
environment.  However, student body diversity should not focus primarily on racial 
diversity.215  While not currently  mandated by the Supreme Court, universities should 
ultimately eliminate racial preferences as a means to achieving diversity.216  The focus 
on racial diversity simply reinforces the stereotype that all members of a minority group 
think the same, and the resulting resentment among other students is too high a price to 
pay towards the goal of equality.217     
 
2.  The Immediate Task 
 
The immediate task of universities should be to adhere more closely to the spirit of 
Bakke.218  Universities which utilize multi-track admissions processes with lower and 
                                                 
214  The term “diversity” gives rise to varied images of what constitutes diversity.  See 
Chin, supra  note 5, at 881 (writing that “Bakke is incoherent because it does not explain 
whether the diversity it tries to foster is cultural or racial”); Scanlan, supra  note 117, at 1612 
(“Achieving a diverse student body depends on two discrete but overlapping sets of 
contributors.  One set brings diversity of viewpoints and beliefs, while the other brings 
diversity of experience.”). 
215  While racial diversity is widely embraced by academicians, this author favors a more 
general concept of student body diversity which does not focus on the racial component.  
But see Scanlan, supra  note 117, at 1609. 
Diversity in America’s education systems is essential in today’s increasingly 
multicultural society.  While adding racial diversity alone may not create a 
completely heterogeneous educational environment, it is an essential part of 
fostering an atmosphere in which many different viewpoints are expressed freely. 
Id.    
216  See Epstein, supra note 195, at 40 (“To speak of diversity is an effective way to get 
around the questions of differential standards that are so troublesome with affirmative action 
programs.”); Graglia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to Requiring 
Racial Discrimination in Employment, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 30, at 
113 (“I do not believe that racial preferences . . . can ever be made acceptable to the vast 
majority of the American people.”). 
217  See Kahlenberg, supra  note 195, at 728 (“It is time to get beyond racial preferences, 
however, and all their toxic side effects.”). 
218  Chin, supra note 5, at 881 (writing that a university refusal to follow Bakke by relying 
on non-diversity grounds in developing their affirmative action programs “ultimately may lead 
the Supreme Court to implement a strict colorblind rule”); see Schimmel, supra note 86, at 1067 
(“University attorneys and administrators should revisit Bakke and follow it more closely.  In 
most cases, they should end separate minority admissions committees, waiting lists, and 
scholarships, and avoid dramatic differences in standards used to admit minority 
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different academic standards for minorities should eliminate them immediately; indeed, 
these are the affirmative action plans which generate the most hostility among the 
races.219  In addition, they often do minorities a disservice by setting them up for 
academic failure.220 To alleviate the immediate negative impact in terms of qualified 
minorities, universities should continue to use race as a “plus” factor while they develop 
new race-neutral means of ensuring student body diversity.221 
 
One place for universities to start is to reconsider their selection criteria.  With some 
careful attention to the content and weight of admissions factors, including standardized 
test scores, grade point averages, and economic disadvantage, schools will be able to 
minimize the effects of eliminating lower and different academic standards for 
minorities.222  An added benefit is that by experimenting now, they will also be paving 
                                                                                                                         
applicants.”).  
219  See Lino A. Graglia, Race Norming in Law School Admissions, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97, 
100-01 (1992) (writing about the use of lower selection criteria for minorities). 
The result of race norming in law school admissions is to produce an entering 
class with two separate student bodies, identifiable by race, essentially in different 
academic ballparks.  Everyone realizes that if the blacks were the academic equals of 
the whites, they would not require lower admission standards, and that if they are 
not the academic equals of the whites, they cannot be expected to compete with 
them academically.  A racially preferential admissions policy is therefore a 
prescription for a loss rather than a gain for blacks in self-respect and the respect of 
others.  Inevitable effects are heightened racial consciousness and frustration, 
resentment, and self-segregation on the part of the blacks. 
Id.  The author contends that economic and educational background would be a better proxy 
than race.  Id. at 101. 
220  See Lacey, supra note 48, at 115.  The author writes that preferential admissions 
policies have resulted in minorities “being admitted to schools where they just do not have 
the academic training necessary to succeed.”  Id.  “They are simply going to the wrong 
schools.”  Id.  As a result, “three-fourths of minority students are failing to graduate.”  Id. 
221  After Hopwood and Proposition 209, race cannot be used as a “plus” factor in higher 
education admissions in the Fifth Circuit or in California. 
222  See John Cloud, What Does SAT Stand For?, TIME, Nov. 10, 1997, at 54.  The author 
writes that one way public universities in Texas and California have found to remain racially 
diverse is to “scrap SATs.”  Id.   
The University of California is considering a proposal by its Latino Eligibility Task 
Force to eliminate SATs from admissions decisions in order to boost Latino 
enrollment.  Public universities in Texas have already dropped standardized tests for 
many applicants in order to comply with a state law passed earlier this year 
automatically admitting those who finish in the top 10% of their high school--no 
questions asked, no SATs required. 
Id.  But see Lacey, supra  note 48, at 118 (“When universities lower their academic standards 
in the name of diversity, no one benefits.  Universities are hurting themselves by sacrificing 
quality for quantity, but more importantly, they are hurting minority students.”). 
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the way for the elimination of racial preferences in the future.      
 
3.  Early Intervention 
 
Preferential admissions policies in higher education only serve to mask the true cause 
of educational underachievement by minorities.  The source of minority 
underachievement is deficiencies in the education process.223 Consequently, the greatest 
resources should be allocated to early intervention measures designed to improve the 
quality of education at the lower levels.  Universities can assist greatly by reallocating 
some of the funds currently used for academic support programs224 to race-neutral 
outreach programs.225  Universities, however, should not bear the burden alone; society 
as a whole must take interest in committing the appropriate funds and efforts towards 
improving the quality of education.226      
                                                 
223  Lacey, supra note 48, at 117 (footnote omitted) (“The use of affirmative action in higher 
education has served to mask the real problem.  The real problem is the need for educational 
reform where it will make a difference--at the kindergarten through twelfth grade levels.”); see 
Wolff, supra  note 146, at 627 (“To ensure that minorities have an equal chance at achieving 
the grades and test scores necessary to gain admittance to graduate schools, lower level 
education must be improved.”). 
224  Lacey, supra  note 48, at 116.  The author writes that “[a] study of law schools found 
that over 100 of the nation’s law schools had some sort of academic support program.”  Id.  
These programs were developed primarily to “compensate for the shortcomings in a minority 
student’s education.”  Id.  “Remedial education programs, no matter how ambitious, cannot 
succeed when the majority of students arrive on campus not having read Shakespeare and 
taken calculus.”  Id. at 117. 
225  Id.  (“Rather than spending millions of dollars offering ineffective remedial courses and 
academic support programs at the college level, that money should be allocated to programs 
that provide support and assistance to promising young minority students.”).  This author 
would allocate the funds on an economic disadvantage basis rather than a racial basis.  Lacey 
cites Upward Bound as an example of a positive program.  Id.  “Students who have shown 
promise during junior high school are given the opportunity to attend special afterschool and 
weekend programs during their high school careers in the hopes of negating the effects of 
their disadvantaged backgrounds.”  Id.  Another author encourages the development of 
programs similar to one at Southern Methodist University whereby students reside in a low 
income neighborhood and conduct tutoring programs for children in the neighborhood.  Id.; 
Wolff, supra note 146, at 656.  “The theory is that by more effectively preparing elementary 
and middle school students, the diversity issue will take care of itself; students will be able to 
achieve the needed grades in high school and college so that they will be admitted without 
the need for affirmative action programs.”  Id.   
226  See Rubenfeld, supra  note 61, at 471 (“If I had to choose, I would probably vote to 
scrap the entire patchwork of affirmative action measures in this country in favor of a massive 
capital infusion into inner-city day care and educational facilities.”).  The author writes 
further, however, that this approach considers affirmative action’s costs and benefits, not its 
constitutionality.  Id.  From a constitutional standpoint, the author asserts that affirmative 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Hopwood, Proposition 209, and Gratz signify the need for an overhaul of affirmative 
action as it exists today.  The original goals of equality and nondiscrimination embedded 
in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have become distorted in 
a most ironic way: Those laws enacted to prevent discrimination actually promote it in 
their application.227   
 
Preferential admissions policies by universities are but one example of this distorted 
application of equality.  While change is desperately needed, drastic action such as that 
mandated by Hopwood risks negating some of the undeniably positive effects of 
preferential admissions policies.228  Diversity, however, can be achieved without 
admissions policies which give racial preferences.229  Universities should begin 
                                                                                                                         
action “is not inconsistent with the commitment made by this nation when it enacted the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. 
227  See Lino A. Graglia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to 
Requiring Racial Discrimination, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 105 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 
1994). 
The history of the law of racial discrimination since the 1964 Act, however, is the 
history of a Supreme Court-led counterrevolution.  The Court has converted the 
Brown nondiscrimination principle and the various provisions of the Act that 
embodied it into essentially their opposites: authorizations or even requirements of 
racial discrimination.  The Court has never admitted (indeed, it has always denied) 
that it was making such a change, always insisting that it was merely continuing to 
enforce the Brown principle.  The result is that a regime of permissible or 
compulsory racial discrimination has been established by the Court in the name of 
enforcing constitutional and statutory prohibitions against such discrimination, a 
judicial feat without parallel in the history of law. 
Id. 
228  Despite their overall negative impact, preferential admissions policies have concededly 
produced positive results  as well.  See Jacobius, supra  note 144, at 23.  For example, 
according to Herma Hill Kay, dean of the University of California at Berkeley’s Boalt Hall 
School of Law, diversity in the U.S. legal profession has produced dramatic results.  Id.  While 
thirty years ago only 3 out of every 100 lawyers were women and less then 1 percent were 
African American, today the Bureau of Labor Statistics lists 24.6 percent of U.S. lawyers as 
women, 3.3 percent as African American, and 3.1 percent as Hispanic.  Id.  Boalt Hall’s 
experience has mirrored this trend.  Id.  The law school went from 4 percent women and only a 
few minorities in the 1960's to a 1994 class composition of 48 percent women, 12 percent 
African American, 13 percent Hispanic, 14 percent Asians and 1 percent Native American.  Id. 
 (Note: These statistics were prior to the 1995 decision by the California Board of Regents to 
eliminate race, ethnicity, and gender factors in admissions decisions beginning 1997.).   
229  See Kahlenberg, supra  note 195, at 728.  The author writes that “[r]ace conscious, but 
nonpreferential, civil rights statutes are necessary to address contemporary discrimination.”  
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contemplating a phase-out of race considerations in their admissions decisions by 
eliminating controversial and unfair multi-track admissions programs.  To mitigate the 
negative impact on minorities, universities should concurrently reexamine the content 
and weight of their  decision factors and contemplate race-neutral outreach programs 
where they can impact a potential applicant earlier in the education process.  At the 
same time, the political process should commit funds and resources to early 
intervention measures designed to improve educational quality. 
 
Few would suggest that America has achieved racial equality.230  However, 
Hopwood, Proposition 209, and Gratz  indicate that an increasing number of Americans 
believe we’re moving ever closer to the equality ideal expressed by the Supreme Court 
back in 1883:231 
 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has 
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the 
special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be 
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.232 
 
Corinne E. Anderson 
                                                                                                                         
Id. 
230  Id.  (“American society is not likely to be in a position to ‘get beyond’ race any time 
soon.”).  
231  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
232  Id. 
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